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INTRODUCTION

As sirens wail and smoke appears on the horizon, one passenger
remarks to the dri ver on the in juries the accident caused. Elsewhere a
woman drops and shatters a water glass and the friend whose home
she is visiting cuts herself on the shards ; when she apologizes for the
injury, her friend accepts . After all, anyone could see it was an
* I would like to thank Professsors Bruce Frier, Don Herzog, and Richard Friedman for
their willingness to read and comment on early drafts, my Note Editors, Dan Loeffler,
Margaret Curtiss, and Daniel Tenny for their patience and suggestions, Justin Bell, Sarah
Bender-Nash, Heidi Bond, Ryan Calo, Yasmine Chubin, Jayson Cohen, Winston Collier,
Melanie Ehler, Christine Goldstein, John Hardison, Damon Lewis, Elizabeth Lintz, Melissa
Marks, Jeremy Schwartz and William Tran for citation checking, source gathering and
proofreading assistance, Professor Mary Kelley, the staff of the Michigan law library,
Thomas Corcoran, Aaron Lewis, Joanne Werdel, Julia Lee, Caroline Fayard, my family, and
Greg Walton for their generous willingness to help me produce, refine, and substantiate my
arguments, Nancy Vettorello, Professors Rebecca Scott, Sam Gross, Phoebe Ellsworth, and
Susanna Blumenthal, and Justices Mills and Green for preparation and support, Brian
Hagerty and Anna-Rose Mathieson for being excellent role models, and William Jentes,
without whom this Note would not have been written.
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accident. Both ca se s capture the apparent simplicity of identifying
accident s and injurie s. In many ca se s people intuitively and in stantly
know they have occurred. Yet it i smuch more difficult to explain why
a child announce s that she ha shad an "accident " when she ha s soiled
her self or whether the addictive, life-threatening plea sure that
accompanie s cocaine u se con stitute s an "injury." Doe s a soldier who
unintentionally trigger s a landmine purpo sefully set by enemy troop s
or a drunk driver who wrap s hi s car around a tree die accidentally?
What di stingui she sthe injury a strangler cau se sfrom the experience of
holding one' sbreath under water?
Court s, it turn s out , have had many conflicting an swer s to the se
que stion s. The i ssue ari se s becau se mo st accident-in surance policie s
guarantee recovery for injurie s and death s occa sioned by "external,
violent and accidental mean s" but exclude intentionally self-inflicted
injury.1 In adjudicating such ca se s, court s mu st apply intuition s about
the occurrence of accident s and injurie s to a dizzying array of exotic
fact pattern s. 2 The in surance policie s provide little guidance beyond
the spar se language above. 3 And becau se court shave found it difficult
to articulate the intuition s behind identification s of accident s and
injurie s,they have come to incon si stent re sult s.4
Ca se s involving autoerotic-a sphyxiation death s illu strate the
difficulty. Autoerotic a sphyxiation i s the practice of temporarily
depriving one self of oxygen while ma sturbating in order to increa se
sexual sen sation, and death can re sult when the flow of oxygen i s not
re stored in a timely manner. 5Practitioner sdie either becau se they pa ss
1. Adam F. Scales,

Man, God and the Serbonian Bog: The Evolution of Accidental

86 IOWA L. REV. 173, 234 (2000) (quoting MARTIN P. CORNELIUS,
ACCIDENTAL MEANS 4-5 (1916) ("external, violent and accidental means")); id. at 294
("intentionally self-inflicted injury"}; see also Oldring v. Metro. Life Ins. Co., 492 F. Supp.
994, 997 (D.N.J. 1980) (discussing prior cases of "courts interpreting accidental means

Death Insurance,

provisions"); Padfield v. AIG Life Ins. Co., 290 F.3d 1121 (9th Cir. 2002} (involving an
intentionally self-inflicted injury clause).
2. The Supreme Court most recently struggled with this question during oral arguments
in Olympic Airways v. Husain, while considering an accidental death claim in which an
airline passenger died after prolonged exposure to tobacco smoke. Oral Argument, Olympic
Airways v. Husain, 540 U.S. 644 (2004} (No. 02-1348), available at
http://www.
supremecourtus.gov/oral_arguments/argument_transcripts/02-1348.pdf (last visited June 6,
2005).
3. Scales, supra note 1, at 234, 294.
4.

See, e.g., Wickman v. Northwestern Nat'! Ins. Co., 908 F.2d 1077, 1087 (1st Cir. 1990)
("Much of the inconsistency in the case law defining and applying the definition of accident
is traceable to the difficulty in giving substance to a concept which is largely intuitive.");
Gordon v. Metro. Life Ins. Co., 260 A.2d 338, 340 (Md. 1970} ("[T]he entire field of accident
law" is a bog and "[t]he main component of the bog is a wide variety of facts in a context
even broader than the fact-smothered field of negligence law."); Scales, supra note 1, at 294
(discussing the different outcomes courts have reached when applying intentionally self
inflicted-injury exclusions).
5.

See, e.g.,

Parker v. Danaher Corp., 851 F. Supp. 1287, 1289 (W.D. Ark. 1994)

(describing autoerotic asphyxiation as "an attempt to increase sexual gratification from
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out before re storing the flow of oxygen or becau se a mechanical safety
apparatu sfail s. 6 Court s have not characterized such death sa s suicide s
but have struggled with whether to deem them "accident s" that are
covered by in surance policie s.
To date, hard number s on the death rate of autoerotic
a sphyxiation have been difficult to produce. The number of death sper
year re sulting from autoerotic a sphyxiation ha s been variou sly
calculated to lie between forty and two-thou sand. 7 But becau se of
underreporting , the number of annual incident s or practitioner s i s
largely unknown. 8 Thu s the only firm statement one can make about
autoerotic a sphyxiation i s that throughout the general population
"death by autoerotic a sphyxiation i s stati stically rare. "9 Nonethele ss,
expert s and court s have tended to concur that mo st incident s of
autoerotic a sphyxiation end in survival and do not produce seriou s or
permanent injury.10 A s a re sult of thi sinformation and it sob scure and
masturbation . . . by . . . restricting the supply of oxygen to the brain in an attempt to
intensify the sensations of masturbation"); Critchlow v. First UNUM Life Ins. Co., 198 F.
Supp. 2d 318, 325-26 (W.D.N.Y. 2002) [hereinafter Critchlow I] ("It is common knowledge
that strangulation will result in death if it continues long enough . . . . ), aff'd, 340 F.3d 130
(2d Cir. 2003), vacated and rev'd, 378 F.3d 246 (2d Cir. 2004).
"

6.

Bennett v. Am

.

Int') Life Assurance Co., 956 F. Supp. 201, 204 (N.D.N.Y. 1997)

(quoting AMERICAN PSYCHIATRIC ASSOCIATION, DIAGNOSTIC AND STATISTICAL
MANUAL OF MENTAL DISORDERS § 302.83 (4th ed. 1994)) (describing how due to
"equipment malfunction, errors in the placement of the noose or ligature, or other mistakes,
accidental deaths sometimes occur"); Cronin v. Zurich Am Ins. Co., 189 F. Supp. 2d 29, 38
(S.D.N.Y. 2002) ("This loss of awareness and control in the search for an ever more intense
high risks death, and limits the conscious ability to reverse death's grasp.").
.

7. See, e.g., Conn. Gen. Life Ins. Co. v. Tommie, 619 S.W.2d 199, 202 (Tex. App. 1981)
(summarizing expert testimony to the effect that "forty deaths per year were reported in the
United States as a result of such activity"); Lonergan v. Reliance Standard Life Ins. Co., No.
CV-96-11832-PBS, 1997 U.S. Dist. LEXIS 24075, at *3 (D. Mass. May 29, 1997) (quoting
Kessler Aff. at 6-7) ("approximately 2,000 deaths occur per year in this country arising out of
autoerotic stimulation"). Courts have also acknowledged the difficulties in finding reliable
numbers. See, e.g., Todd v. AIG Life Ins. Co., No. 3:93CV0054-R, 1994 U.S. Dist. LEXIS
21539, at *20 (N.D. Tex. Mar. 24, 1994) [hereinafter Todd I] (quoting Katherine
Seigenthaler, No Intention of Killing Themselves, WASH. POST, June 12, 1985, Health
Section at 7) ("The Washington Post reported that the actual number of annual deaths 'is
difficult to gauge because experts believe many are mistaken for suicides or murders."'),
modified, 47 F.3d 1448 (5th Cir. 1995).

see

8. The numbers are so scarce that few sources even comment on the question. But
Peter M.E. Cummings et al., Auto-erotic Asphyxia, at http://www.geocities.com/

pathologypete/autocasel.html (last visited June 6, 2005) ("The exact number of individuals
practicing autoerotic asphyxiation in the general population is unknown . . . .").
9. Critchlow v. First UNUM Life Ins. Co., 340 F.3d 130, 138 (2d Cir. 2003) [hereinafter
(Kearse, J., dissenting) (summarizing expert opinions), vacated and rev'd, 378
F.3d 246 (2d Cir. 2004). Note that this provides little insight into the cumulative risks that

Critchlow II]

ongoing practitioners of autoerotic asphyxiation face.
10. See Critchlow II, supra note 9, 340 F.3d at 137 (Kearse, J., dissenting) (quoting a
February 18, 2002 report by Stephen J. Hucker, Medical Director, Professor of Psychiatry,
and Head of the Division of Forensic Psychiatry in the Forensic Program of McMaster
University) ("[A)utoerotic asphyxia) episodes do not, inevitably, or even substantially likely,
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inconclu sive nature, one cannot say that practitioner s of autoerotic
a sphyxiation ought to ex pect to die.11 Nonethele ss, court s have
reached di sparate deci sion s on the practice' s accidentalne ss and
injuriou sne ss.12
Mo st court s have a ssigned "accident " a lay definition when
inter preting accident-in surance policie s.13 The difficulty ha s ari sen in

lead to a fatal outcome."); Cronin, 189 F. Supp. 2d at 38 ("If the practitioner retains his
senses, and the experts maintain that most do, the pressure on the carotid arteries can be
relieved in time to prevent permanent damage to the tissues of the neck or brain, and the
body can recuperate."); Tommie, 619 S.W.2d at 202 (summarizing expert testimony to the
effect that "death is not the normal expected result"); ROBERT R. ET AL., AUTOEROTIC
FATALITIES 49 (1983) (stating that autoerotic asphyxiation ends "more often than not with a
nonfatal outcome"). For more examples, see infra note 11.
11. Courts that grant recovery take this approach. E.g., Tommie, 619 S.W.2d at 202
(granting recovery after explaining that "death is not the normal expected result of that
behavior" (summarizing expert testimony)). Cf Todd I, supra note 7, 1994 U.S. Dist. LEXIS
21539, at *23 (arguing that because most people do not perceive the risks of sexual asphyxia,
fatal results are not reasonably foreseeable). They often explain that it is more likely than
not that practitioners will survive autoerotic asphyxiation or at least assert that death is not
quite "substantially certain" and hold that such levels of foreseeability are insufficient to
preclude classification as accidents. Id. at *33 ("This Court finds as a matter of law that
death is not a substantially certain result to be expected from participating in autoerotic
acts."); Tommie, 619 S.W.2d at 202-03 ("[A]lthough the type of activity in which Mr.
Tommie was engaged was foolish and fraught with substantial risk of injury or death, it was
not of such a nature that the insured should have reasonably known that it would probably
result in his death."); Kennedy v. Wash. Nat'! Ins. Co., 401 N.W. 2d 842, 846 (Wis. Ct. App.
1987) ("It was a foolish act involving some risk of injury or death, but it was not of such a
nature that Kennedy knew or should have known that it probably would result in death" and
"[d]eath was not a normal expected result."); id. ("Although Kennedy's act can be
considered bizarre or unusual, we agree . . . that there is no evidence that Kennedy's death
was highly probable, expected, or a natural result."). Pro-recovery courts sometimes concede
that autoerotic asphyxiation is relatively risky, but still argue that it is not so risky as to be
nonaccidental. See Todd v. AIG Life Ins. Co., 47 F.3d 1448, 1456 (5th Cir. 1995) [hereinafter
Todd II] ("[T]he materials before the court clearly indicated that the likelihood of death
from autoerotic activity falls far short of what would be required to negate coverage . . . .");
MAMSI Life & Health Ins. Co. v. Callaway, 825 A.2d 995, 1001 (Md. 2003) [hereinafter
MAMSI Ill] (summarizing MAMSI Life & Health Ins. Co. v. Callaway, 806 A.2d 274 (Md.
Ct. App. 2002) [hereinafter MAMSI II], vacated, MAMSI Ill, supra) (explaining that the
lower court "analogized autoerotic asphyxiation with other activities that are inherently
dangerous, although apparently more socially acceptable in the mainstream of extreme
human recreational activities - skydiving, bungee jumping, white water rafting, parasailing,
mountain climbing, and scuba diving - to support its finding that the injuries" resulted from
an accident).
12. Compare, e.g. , Padfield v. AIG Life Ins. Co., 290 F.3d 1121 (9th Cir. 2002) (finding
autoerotic-asphyxiation deaths accidental), with Sigler v. Mut. Benefit Life Ins. Co., 663 F.2d
49 (8th Cir. 1981) [hereinafter Sigler II] (opposite); compare Fawcett v. Metro. Life Ins. Co.,
No. C-3-97-540, 2000 U.S. Dist. LEXIS 10061 (S.D. Ohio June 28, 2000) (finding autoerotic
asphyxiation injurious), with Padfield, 290 F.3d 1121 (9th Cir. 2002) (opposite).
13. Courts generally reason that the word "accident" is only susceptible to its lay
meaning. Cf, e.g. , Olson v. Am. Bankers Ins. Co., 35 Cal. Rptr. 2d 897, 901-02 (Ct. App.
1994) (quoting Pilcher v. N.Y. Life Ins. Co., 102 Cal. Rptr. 82, 85 (Ct. App. 1972)) ("'[T]he
words "accident" and "accidental" have never acquired any technical meaning in the law
and must be construed according to ordinary understanding and common usage."').
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application. 14 As one justice of the California Supreme Court noted,
most laypeople can agree on a heartland of cases that do and do not
constitute accidents but cannot formulate the principles underlying
their categorizations.15 The problem is that while accidents clearly
involve an unintended and unforeseen result, they do not include all
such results. 16 Substantially all laypeople would likely agree, for
instance, that an accident "is not . . . a death from disease, nor a death
from the natural causes of old age. "17 But when courts have tried to
articulate how laypeople make these intuitive distinctions, they have
generally failed.18 As one rather resignedly explained, "Probably the
best definition is Cardozo's tautology that an accident is what the
public calls an accident, which aids jurists in deciding individual cases
only slightly. "19 And because of this difficulty, they have come to
inconsistent results in assessing the accidentalness of autoerotic
asphyxiation deaths.20
Most accident-insurance policies also include a clause that forbids
recovery where the harm results from an intentionally self-inflicted
injury. 21 To trigger the clause, the insured must intentionally injure
herself in a way that results in a further, unintentional injury. For
instance, a person who slit her wrists as a cry for help but then bled to
death on the way to the hospital would not recover for either the

14. One could contest the existence of common, Jay definitions of words, and thus argue
that this difficulty arises because words are always slippery and ambiguous. Whatever the
merits of that position in general, this Note argues that in this context Jay definitions produce
determinate outcomes.
15. Weil v. Fed. Kemper Life Assurance Co., 866 P.2d 774, 803 (Cal. 1994) (Mosk, J.,
dissenting) (reasoning that most people would define accidents through examples); see also
Burr v. Commercial Travelers Mut. Accident Ass'n of Am., 67 N.E.2d 248, 251 (N.Y. 1946)
(noting that most people would stumble "if asked to formulate a written definition of the
word").
16. Burr, 67 N.E.2d at 251 (reasoning that a layperson "would say that the term applied
only to an unusual and extraordinary happening; that it must be the result of chance; that the
cause must be unanticipated or, if known, the result must be unexpected").
17. Weil, 866 P.2d at 803 (Mosk, J., dissenting). In Weil, dissenting Justice Mosk
contrasted this observation with the claim that a layperson forced to define an accident
"would probably be reduced to describing the deaths in such broad and general terms as
happening by chance, unusual, unforeseen, unanticipated, unexpected, and unintended." Id.
18. Scales, supra note 1, at 236-37 (noting that while "courts could turn to this reservoir
of common understanding where the strict technical definition was unavailing or inapposite"
they "often entertained implausible, if not bizarre, notions regarding the average person's
understanding of the term 'accident"'); see also Wickman v. Northwestern Nat'! Ins. Co., 908
F.2d 1077, 1087 (1st Cir. 1990) ("Much of the inconsistency in the case Jaw defining and
applying the definition of accident is traceable to the difficulty in giving substance to a
concept which is largely intuitive.").
19. Wickman, 908 F.2d at 1086 (summarizing Landress v. Phoenix Mut. Life Ins. Co.,
291 U.S. 491 (1934) (Cardozo, J., dissenting)).
20.

See supra note 12.

21.

See supra note 1 and accompanying text.
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intended loss of blood (nonaccidental) or the accidental fatality that
followed (result of intentionally self-inflicted injury). Courts have
divided over whether such clauses preclude recovery in cases of
autoerotic-as phyxiation deaths. Some have concluded that decedents
intentionally injure themselves when they tem porarily cut the su p ply
of oxygen to their brains.22 Others have disagreed, holding that
tem porary and voluntary de privation of oxygen does not constitute an
injury within a lay definition.23 A third grou p has found the question
sufficiently close to allow insurers to settle it under clauses granting
them the right to inter pret policy terms.24 As with accidents, the
controversy arises from difficulties in defining a common and
seemingly uncom plicated word.
This Note argues that autoerotic-as phyxiation deaths are accidents
and not the results of intentionally self-inflicted injuries. Part I
formally analyzes accident-insurance case law to show that current,
viable a p proaches to accident insurance indicate that autoerotic
as phyxiation deaths are accidental. Part I I claims autoerotic
as phyxiation deaths should not trigger intentionally self-inflicted
injury exclusion clauses because the practice does not intentionally
injure. This Note concludes beneficiaries should recover when
accident-insurance policyholders die during autoerotic as phyxiation.
I.

AUTOEROTIC-ASPHYXIATION DEATHS ARE ACCIDENTAL

This Part advances a new test for determining whether death from
autoerotic as phyxiation is accidental and contends that this new test is
su perior to alternative a p proaches.25 The first ste p under this test is
22.

See infra note

123 and accompanying text.

23.

See infra note

124 and accompanying text.

24. See infra note 125 and accompanying text; Cozzie v. Metro. Life Ins. Co., 140 F.3d
1104, 1107 (7th Cir. 1998) ("When language granting . . . broad power to interpret the
document is vested in the fiduciary, we have held that the appropriate standard of review
ought to be the 'arbitrary and capricious' standard." (s ummarizing Cutting v. Jerome Foods,
Inc., 993 F.2d 1293, 1295 (7th Cir. 1993)).
25. Courts do not currently explicitly follow the approach I delineate. Instead, they
undertake analyses that do not explain the results they reach, especially in autoerotic
asphyxiation cases. Today, a majority of courts purport to equate accidental harms with
unforeseeable ones. See infra note 92. These courts come out both ways in autoerotic
asphyxiation cases. Compare Padfield v. AIG Life Ins. Co., 290 F.3d 1121 (9th Cir. 2002),
Parker v. Danaher Corp., 851 F. Supp. 1287 (W.D. Ark. 1994), Todd I, supra note 7, 1994
U.S. Dist. LEXIS 21539 (N.D. Tex. 1994), modified, 47 F.3d 1448 (5th Cir. 1995), Conn. Gen.
Life Ins. Co. v. Tommie, 619 S.W.2d 199 (Tex. App. 1981), and Kennedy v. Wash. Nat'l Ins.
Co., 401 N.W.2d 842 (Wis. Ct. App. 1987) (all granting recovery), with Sigler II, supra note
12, 663 F.2d 49 (8th Cir. 1981), Int'l Underwriters, Inc. v. Home Ins. Co., 662 F.2d 1084 (4th
Cir. 1981), Cronin v. Zurich Am Ins. Co., 189 F. Supp. 2d 29 (S.D.N.Y. 2002), and Lonergan
v. Reliance Standard Life Ins. Co., No. CA 96-11832-PBS, 1997 U.S. Dist. LEXIS 24075 (D.
Mass. May 29, 1997) (denying recovery), with Bennett v. Am Int'l Life Assurance Co., 956
F. Supp. 201 (N.D.N.Y. 1997) (denying insurer motion for s ummary judgment and sending
case to trial). In two instances, courts denied recovery because the absence of a mechanical
.

.
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resolving whether death is the expected result of the practice. If not,
courts should then grant recovery unless they determine autoerotic
asphyxiation constitutes either a crime or a "high-risk act of bravura."
A high-risk act of bravura is (1) an extremely dangerous activity; (2)
that practitioners engage in for the purpose of exposing themselves to
risk;and (3) that serves no valuable end.26
In defending the above test, this Part argues that it better reflects
the actual practices of courts than do the workable alternatives that
courts purport to apply. Section I. A argues that in most cases, courts
have found unexpected results - like deaths during instances of
autoerotic asphyxiation -to be accidents. It then observes that courts
have hindered recovery in cases involving certain types of stigmatized
activity, but explains that the stigma that attaches to autoerotic
asphyxiation is of a different type. Section l.B contends that although
some courts have advanced an alternate approach known as
"accidental-means analysis," the analysis depends upon a distinction
without a difference and thus provides no grounds upon which to
reach a contrary result. This Part concludes that autoerotic
asphyxiation deaths are accidents.
A. Formal Analysis Reveals the Accidentalness ofAutoerotic
Asphyxiation Deaths
This Section proposes a test that reflects the current practices of
courts. Section 1explains that courts generally grant recovery in cases
involving unexpected results. This encompasses the deaths that arise
from autoerotic asphyxiation. Section 2 observes that courts have
hindered recovery in cases involving crimes or high-risk acts of
bravura. Because most courts have not explicitly acknowledged the
role that these,but not other,stigmatized activities have factored into
their considerations, their analyses of the issue have not been formal.

safety apparatus sufficiently increased the risk of death from autoerotic asphyxiation so as to
make survival expectations unreasonable. Sigler II, supra note 1 2 , 663 F.2d at 50; Lonergan,
1997 U.S. Dist. LEXIS 24075, at *17. One court that granted recovery reasoned that the fact
that the decedent had survived autoerotic asphyxiation on many occasions weighed "in the
determination of whether death was substantially likely to result." Bennett, 956 F. Supp. at
212. Another court noted both the decedent's twenty years of experience practicing
autoerotic asphyxiation and the mechanical safety apparatus he had unsuccessfully
employed in granting recovery. Critchlow v. First UNUM Life Ins. Co., 378 F.3d 246 (2d Cir.
2004) [hereinafter Critchlow III]. For a discussion of autoerotic-asphyxiation cases in other
jurisdictions, see infra notes 118-119 and accompanying text.
26. While bravura indicates both exposure to risk for its own sake and social display,
this Note uses it more broadly to encompass solitary behaviors as well. 2 THE OXFORD
ENGLISH DICTIONARY 498 (J.A. Simpson & E.S.C. Weiner eds., 2d ed. 1989) (defining
bravura as a "[d]isplay of daring"). To the extent that solitarily subjecting oneself to a high
risk activity constitutes attempting suicide, the distinction becomes one without a difference
for the purposes of this Note.
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This has created problems in autoerotic-asphyxiation cases, where
courts have observed the stigma that attaches to the activity and then
implicitly and unconvincingly analogized it to a crime or high-risk act
of bravura. This Section illuminates why only crimes and high-risk acts
of bravura, and not other sources of stigma, should and do impede
recovery. Conse quently, courts ought to grant recovery in autoerotic
asphyxiation cases.

1.

Foreseeability

In many cases, laypeople's determinations of accidentalness hinge
on the likelihood that the injury-causing activity would cause a harm
similar to the one that occurred.27 This Note maintains that as a
general matter, harms are only so likely to occur as to be
nonaccidental if they are the expected result of an activity. This
standard is consistent with courts' historical and modern tendencies.
While different modern courts set the level of foreseeability necessary
to preclude recovery at various levels,28recent courts have returned to
definitions of accident that exclude harms on foreseeability grounds
only when they represent the expected outcome of the injury-causing
event. Federal courts have led and exemplified the change.29 Under
the Employee Retirement Income Security Act of 1974 ( "ER I S A"),

27.

See infra notes 36-39 and accompanying text.

28. While most modem courts have purported to use foreseeability tests, they have
often disagreed over the level of foreseeability that precludes recovery. Compare Todd ll,
supra note 11, 47 F.3d 1448, 1456 (5th Cir. 1995) (holding that a subjective expectation of
survival indicates accidentalness unless the risk of death "reach[es) the level of 'substantial
certainty"'), with Sigler ll, supra note 12, 663 F.2d at 49 (quoting Sigler v. Mut. Benefit Life
Ins. Co., 506 F. Supp. 542, 544 (S.D. Iowa 1981) [hereinafter Sigler/], affd, 663 F.2d 49 (8th
Cir. 1981)) (summarizing Iowa law to the effect that no accident occurs where "a reasonable
person would have recognized that his actions could result in his death"). They have also
differed over whether to measure perceptions of risk subjectively or objectively. Compare
Santaella v. Metro. Life Ins. Co., 123 F.3d 456, 462 (7th Cir. 1997) (quoting JOHN ALAN
APPLEMAN, INSURANCE LAW AND PRACTICE, WITH FORMS § 360, at 452-53 (1981) ("[I)t is
customary to look at the casualty from the point of view of the insured."), with Gaskins v.
N.Y. Life Ins. Co., 104 So. 2d 171, 177 (La. 1958) (quoting Preferred Accident Ins. Co. v.
Clark, 144 F.2d 165, 167 (10th Cir. 1944)) (characterizing the test as "whether the average
man, under the existing facts and circumstances, would regard the loss so unforeseen,
unexpected, and extraordinary that he would say it was an accident."), with MAMSI Ill,
supra note 11, 825 A.2d 995, 1000 (Md. 2003) ("The test has subjective and objective
components."). Nonetheless, many courts have agreed that once these criteria are set, the
test should be dispositive. See, e.g., Landress v. Phoenix Mut. Life Ins. Co., 291 U.S. 491, 501
n.2 (1934) (Cardozo, J., dissenting) (quoting W. Commercial Travelers' Ass'n v. Smith, 85 F.
401, 405 (8th Cir. 1898)) (finding no accident where result "is the natural and probable
consequence of an act or course of action"); Weil v. Fed. Kemper Life Assurance Co., 866
P.2d 774, 809 (Cal. 1994) (Mosk, J., dissenting) (quoting Collins v. Nationwide Life Ins. Co.,
294 N.W.2d 194, 196 (Mich. 1980)) ("[C)onduct would in all probability result in his death."
(footnote omitted and emphasis added in Weil)).
29. See, e.g. , MAMSI Ill, supra note 11, 825 A.2d at 1001 (discussing federal ERISA
jurisprudence in the context of a state-court accident-insurance claim).
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federal common law reaches large numbers of accident-insurance
cases, preem pting much state law and increasing the influence of the
federal courts. 30 In exercising its influence over accident-insurance law,
much of the federal judiciary a p plies an accidentalness test that the
First Circuit initiated in Wickman v. Northwestern National Insurance
Co.31: injuries are nonaccidental only if they were all but certain to
occur.32
Early courts attem pting to decide whether harms constituted
accidents agreed. They also distinguished situations in which
decedents intentionally killed themselves or engaged in an activity
whose ex pected outcome was death from those in which decedents
intentionally undertook a risky activity which they antici pated
surviving.33

30. 29 U.S.C. §§ 1001-1461 (2000). ERISA's scope is quite broad, encompassing nearly
"any employee benefit plan . . . established or maintained- (1) by any employer engaged in
commerce or in any industry or activity affecting commerce; or (2) by any employee
organization or organizations representing employees engaged in commerce or in any
industry or activity affecting commerce; or (3) by both." Id. § 1003(a). "ERISA trumps
everything - almost any state law cause of action you can think of will be preempted by
ERISA." Jayne Elizabeth Zanglein, Employee Benefits for General Practitioners: Ten Rules
that Every Attorney Should Know About ER/SA, 26 TEX. TECH UNIV. L. REV. 579, 580
( 1995).
31. 908 F.2d 1077 (1st Cir. 1990).
32. See, e.g., Todd II, supra note 11, 47 F.3d at 1456 (explaining that no accident occurs
if "the risk of death involved in the conduct at issue" reaches "the level of 'substantial
certainty"'); cf MAMSI III, supra note 11, 825 A.2d at 1000-01.
33. In 1886, twenty-three years after accident insurance first appeared in the United
States, an Illinois Circuit Court surveyed definitions of accidents proposed by prior courts in
Crandal v. Accident Insurance Co., 27 F. 40 (C.C.N.D. Ill. 1886), affd, 120 U.S. 527 (1887).
See also Accident Insurance, 7 AM. L. REV. 585 (1873) (writing in 1873 that "the first
American [accident-insurance] company is only ten years old"). It found that courts deciding
cases on foreseeability grounds held unusual, unexpected, unintended, and chance events
accidental. The Crandal court found that prior courts had held that an "accident [is] . . . '[a]n
event which, under the circumstances, is unusual and unexpected by the person to whom it
happens; the happening of an event without the concurrence of the will of the person by whose
agency it was caused,"' 27 F. at 42 (incorrectly quoting JOHN BOUVIER, 1 A LAW

DICTIONARY, ADAPTED TO THE CONSTITUTION AND LAWS OF THE UNITED STATES OF
AMERICA, AND OF THE SEVERAL STATES OF THE A MERICAN UNION 37 (1st ed. 1839)),
"any event which takes place without the oversight or expectation of the person acted upon
or affected by the event," id. (quoting Accident Insurance, supra, at 587-88 (quoting Ripley
v. Ry. Passengers' Assurance Co., 20 F. Cas. 823, 825 (C.C.W.D. Mich. 1870) (No. 11854))),
and "any unexpected event which happens as by chance, or which does not take place
according to the usual course of things," id. (quoting Accident Insurance, supra, at 588
(quoting North Am. Life & Accident Ins. Co. v. Burroughs, 69 Pa. 43, 51 ( 1871))). Modern
courts have observed that the common law went even further, requiring specific intent to
hold a death nonaccidental on foreseeability grounds. As the Parker v. Danaher Corp. court
wrote, "[t]he common law . . . prescrib[es] that these terms should be judged from the
viewpoint of the insured," 851 F. Supp. 1287, 1294 (W.D. Ark. 1994) (quoting Wickman v.
Northwestern Nat'! Ins. Co., 908 F.2d 1077, 1087 (1st Cir. 1990)) (first alteration in original),
which "means that unless [a decedent] 'actually expected to die, essentially that he
specifically intended to commit suicide, his death must be considered an accident,"' id.
(quoting and summarizing the plaintiff's argument).
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Although some modem courts have set lower likelihood-of-harm
cutoffs for recovery,34 these approaches are best seen as the legacy of
an anomalous line of late-nineteenth- and early-twentieth-century
cases in which courts manipulated levels of foreseeability so that they
could use foreseeability tests to the exclusion of other approaches.35
The better approach is to consider all relevant considerations
explicitly and, as is the early and modem trend, to only preclude
recovery where injury was an activity's expected result.
Available evidence suggests that laypeople agree with the early
and modern trend. As Justice Mosk of �he California Supreme Court
has observed, "if asked to specify what ... accidental deaths have in

34. The likelihoods of injury necessary to defeat recovery in jurisdictions that consider
only foreseeability of harm have ranged from not "probabl[e], " Kennedy v. Wash. Nat'! Ins.
Co., 401 N.W.2d 842, 846 (Wis. Ct. App. 1987), to anything less than "substantial certainty,"
Todd II, supra note 11, 47 F.3d at 1456. See also MAMSI III, supra note 11, 825 A.2d at 1000
(quoting Cole v. State Farm Mut. Ins. Co., 753 A.2d 533, 540 (Md. 2000)) ("unusual"); Conn.
Gen. Life Ins. Co. v. Tommie, 619 S.W.2d 199, 202 (Tex. App. 1981) (quoting Freeman v.
Crown Life Ins. Co., 580 S.W.2d 897, 900 (Tex. Civ. App. 1979)) ("mere . . . gross
negligence").
Courts have also used bases other than likelihood of harm to determine foreseeability.
See Santaella v. Metro. Life Ins. Co., 123 F.3d 456, 462 (7th Cir. 1997) (quoting Casey v.
Uddeholm Corp., 32 F.3d 1094, 1097 (7th Cir. 1994)) ("unintentional"); Sigler I, supra note
28, 506 F. Supp. 542, 544 (S.D. Iowa 1981) (quoting Rowe v. United Commercial Travelers'
Ass'n, 172 N.W.2d 454, 458 (Iowa 1919)) (not "apparent"). And levels have varied within
individual opinions. See, e.g., Kennedy, 401 N.W.2d at 846 (describing the test as not "highly
probable " or "inevitable," not "natural and probable," more than "negligent," and not
"probabl[e]").
35. This trend likely started with a federal circuit-court case involving a robbery/murder
victim, Ripley v. Railway Passengers' Assurance Co. , 20 F. Cas. 823 (C.C.W.D. Mich. 1870)
(No. 11,854). See Scales, supra note 1, at 238 (describing Ripley as a case in which "the
insured was robbed and murdered while traveling"). Ripley presented the interesting issue of
whether decedents who do not foresee their attack have died accidentally despite the
purposeful nature of their assailants' assaults. After all, killers cannot claim that their attacks
are accidental because their victims did not foresee the attacks but soldiers can speak of the
accidental death of a comrade who unwittingly triggered an enemy landmine. In holding for
the plaintiff, the court did not explicitly address the question, but instead folded it into an
exclusive foreseeability test that defined accidents as "that which occurs to [decedents]
unexpectedly." Ripley, 20 F. Cas. at 825.
Subsequently, the likelihood of harm necessary to preclude recovery fell. Courts that
followed Ripley shared its reliance on the insured's subjective perspective. Because
nineteenth-century jurisprudence held people "to intend the natural and probable
consequence[s] of [their] deeds," this encouraged these courts to find no accident in cases
where insureds suffered unlikely but negligent harms. Scales, supra note 1, at 242 (quoting
W. Commercial Travelers' Ass'n v. Smith, 85 F. 401, 405 (8th Cir. 1898)). Scales elaborates
that, "[t]he idea that an event might be nonaccidental because the insured had been
negligent was spurred by courts' reliance on the insured's subjective perspective, " id. at 245,
and that "[e]ven if the insured was not at fault, circumstances preceding death might
sufficiently alert him to the likelihood of injury so that it would no longer be entirely
'unforeseen' or 'unexpected."' Id. at 242.
Other early cases followed Ripley. See, e.g., Supreme Council of the Order of Chosen
Friends v. Garrigus, 3 N.E. 818 (Ind. 1885) (pistol shot wound); Guldenkirch v. United
States Mut. Accident Ass'n, 5 N.Y.S. 428 (N.Y. City Ct. 1889) (same); Richards v. Travelers'
Ins. Co., 26 P. 762 (Cal. 1891) (struck by third party); Fid. & Cas. Co. v. Johnson, 17 So. 2
(Miss. 1895) (death at the hands of a mob).
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common, the layperson . . . would probably . . . describ[e] the
deaths . . . as happening by chance, unusual, unforeseen,
unanticipated, unexpected, and unintended."36 Dictionaries concur
that accidents indicate harmful events whose outcomes victims neither
intend nor expect.37 Similarly, while it would be strange to see the
deaths of individuals who point loaded guns at their heads while
"entertaining a fanciful expectation that fate would ... favor them" as
accidents, it is normal and natural to deem mountain-climber or deep
sea-diver deaths accidental.38 In fact,insureds likely purchase accident
insurance to mitigate the risk of subsequent unexpected - and thus
unavoided - contingencies and, as laypeople, thereby reveal their
belief that accidents are unforeseen.39 A lay definition finds harms
nonaccidental on foreseeability grounds only if they are the expected
result of the injury-causing activity.
As the Introduction explains, death is not the expected result of
autoerotic asphyxiation.40 Absent some other consideration courts
should hold such deaths accidental.

2.

Stigma and Morality

Although many courts in foreseeability-test jurisdictions have
claimed that foreseeability operates to the exclusion of other
considerations, other courts have observed that morality has affected
outcomes throughout accident-insurance law. Justice Mosk of the
California Supreme Court has noted that moral considerations have
sometimes determined close cases.41 New Jersey's high court has
observed that idiosyncratic moral intuitions of individual courts in

36. Weil v. Fed. Kemper Life Assurance Co., 866 P.2d 774, 803 (Cal. 1994) (Mosk, J.,
dissenting); cf Burr v. Commercial Travelers Mut. Accident Ass'n of Am., 67 N.E.2d 248,
251 (N.Y. 1946) ("[T]he average man would . . . say that the term [accident] applied only to
an unusual and extraordinary happening; that it must be the result of chance; that the cause
must be unanticipated or, if known, the result must be unexpected.").
37. THE AMERICAN HERITAGE DICTIONARY OF THE ENGLISH LANGUAGE 10-11 ( Eds.
of The Am. Heritage Dictionaries eds., 4th ed. 2000) (defining accident as "[a]n unexpected
and undesirable event, especially one resulting in damage or harm"); MERRIAM-WEBSTER'S
COLLEGIATE DICTIONARY 7 (Frederick C. Mish et al. eds., 10th ed. 1997) ("an
unexpected . . . event"); 1 THE OXFORD ENGLISH DICTIONARY, supra note 26, at 74
("[a]nything that happens without foresight or expectation" or "[a]n unfortunate event");
RANDOM HOUSE WEBSTER'S UNABRIDGED DICTIONARY 12 (Wendalyn R. Nichols et al.
eds., 2nd ed. 2001) ("an undesirable or unfortunate happening that occurs unintentionally"
and "any event that happens unexpectedly").
38.

Wickman, 908 F.2d at 1087 (describing russian-roulette practitioners).

39. Weil, 866 P.2d at 808 (Mosk, J., dissenting) ("[I]nsureds purchase accident coverage
in significant part to safeguard themselves or their beneficiaries against the consequences of
their own thoughtless, negligent, or even foolhardy acts.").
40.

See supra notes

41.

Weil, 866

7-11 and accompanying text.

P.2d at 804-06 (Mosk,

J., dissenting).
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individual cases may provide the best guide to how some cases will be
decided. 42 As a result, cases involving similar risks have come out
differently and applications of the tests courts purport to apply have
varied, giving them little predictive power. 43
Despite observing that the stigma that attaches to activities people
consider immoral occasionally affects outcomes,courts have not taken
a formal approach to delineating how or why. This analytic looseness
has led some to analogize the stigma that attaches to autoerotic
asphyxiation practitioners to the stigma that attaches in cases where
courts have hindered recovery. A more formal analysis demonstrates
that courts have hindered recovery only in cases involving crimes or
high-risk acts of bravura.44 Autoerotic asphyxiation falls into neither
category.
Drug-overdose cases illustrate how courts have made recovery
more difficult in cases involving illegal activities. Santaella v.
Metropolitan Life Insurance Co. featured a decedent who died from an
overdose of a prescription drug whose therapeutic dose and fatal dose
were sufficiently similar that fatal results were common. 45 The Seventh
Circuit allowed recovery, finding the evidence insufficient for a jury to
find "death either 'highly likely to occur' . . . or 'substantially certain
to result. "'46 One court even granted recovery after a decedent mixed
prescription drugs and alcohol into a lethal combination.47 Compare
Weil v. Federal Kemper Life Assurance Co. , where the California
42. Linden Motor Freight Co. v. Travelers Ins. Co., 193 A.2d 217, 223 (N.J. 1963) (What
"[t]he broad words 'accident' and 'accidental' . . . encompass . . . largely depends on the
viewpoint of the person whose judgment is to govern.").
43. Id. ("[T]he outcome of cases which one might think factually analogous, as well as
the legal reasoning used to support the conclusion, varies not only from state to state but
within a state."); Weil, 866 P.2d at 805 (Mosk , J., dissenting) (quoting Linden Motor Freight
Co., 193 A.2d at 223) ('"Very much seems to depend upon a court's unexpressed feeling of
the fair and reasonable result in the particular factual setting, with made-to-order criteria
and language then being used to bring about legal conformance to the conclusion previously
reached."').

44. Courts have not precluded recovery in every case where an insured's injury results
from the insured's criminal act or high-risk act of bravura. See, e.g., West v. Aetna Life Ins.
Co., 171 F. Supp. 2d 856 (N.D. Iowa 2001) (granting recovery after the decedent crashed his
car while under the influence of alcohol). Rather, courts have appeared to tip the balance
against recovery when the insured's injury resulted from the insured's illegal act or high-risk
act of bravura. See infra notes 45-50 and accompanying text (explaining how the
accidentalness of drug-overdose deaths can hinge on whether the drugs were illegal or by
prescription). This Note does not delineate the mechanics of this tipping in cases involving
crimes or high-risk acts of bravura.
45. 123 F.3d 456 , 459 (7th Cir. 1997) (quoting R.26 , Ex.2 (Zumwalt Dep.)) ("The
Medical Examiner concluded . . . 'propoxyphene has been associated very commonly with
accidental drug overdoses because there is a very small margin . . . between a therapeutic
dose and a toxic or lethal dose . . . . ').
"

46. Id. at 463; see also Mansbacher v. Prudential Ins. Co. of Am., 7 N.E.2d 18 (N.Y.
1937) (veronal overdose).
47. Metro. Life Ins. Co. v. Main, 383 F.2d 952, 960 (5th Cir. 1967).
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Supreme Court faced a cocaine death in a year when users died
0 .0014% of the time they used.48 Proceeding in part under a standard
that hinged on foreseeability, the court held that "death reasonably
could be anticipated. "49 Writing in dissent, Justice Mosk convincingly
rebutted the majority's rationales. He reasoned the result could only
be reconciled with the majority's fidelity to holding prescription-drug
overdoses nonaccidental if the majority's repeated references to
cocaine's illegality indicated that the majority had granted illegality a
dispositive role. so Stigma alone was not enough: although any of the
decedents in these cases could have been subject to stigma, only the
one using illegal drugs was also subject to criminal sanction.
Courts have drawn a similar distinction between high-risk acts of
bravura and other dangerous activities that provide an experiential
benefit beyond, although not necessary exclusive of,the thrill of peril.
Self-inflicted gunshot wounds are emblematic. In Thompson v.
Prudential Insurance Co. of America, the decedent learned to spin the
chamber of a gun so its bullets never stopped in the firing position. s1
After showing the results of one spin to a friend, he pulled the trigger
without looking at the chamber himself, shooting himself to death. s2
The Georgia court denied recovery.s3 By contrast, in New York Life

48. 866 P.2d 774 (Cal. 1994) (describing and deploying a foreseeability standard while
also using accidental-means analysis that is discussed infra in Part LB); id. at 819 (Mosk, J.,
dissenting) (discussing risks of cocaine use); see also Gordon v. Metro. Life Ins. Co., 260
A.2d 338 (Md. 1970) (heroin fatality).
49. Weil, 866 P.2d at 784. The court explained: "It is readily apparent that the risks
attending the consumption of such substances are so great that death must be considered a
common, natural or substantially likely consequence." Id. at 788.
50. Id. passim (Mosk, J., dissenting). For Mosk's conclusions regarding illegality, see id.
at 823 (Mosk, J., dissenting) (Although "[t]he majority do not squarely hold that the
beneficiaries herein are barred from recovery because Weil's fatal act was illegal," they
"strongly imply that the fact of its illegality weighs heavily against recovery, because they
repeatedly incorporate that fact in their statement of the issues, in their discussion of the
authorities, and in their conclusion."). An early critic agreed with Mosk, claiming that the
outcome depended on illegality to the exclusion of foreseeability. Allison L. Hurst,

Voluntary Ingestiun of a Known Hazardous and Illegal Substance Does Not Provide a Basis
for Coverage Within the Terms of a Life Insurance Policy Affording Coverage for Death by
Accidental Means, California Supreme Court Survey, 22 PEPP. L. REV. 851, 857 (1995) ("The
majority based its conclusion on its cursory analysis that cocaine was a known hazardous and
illegal substance and that its ingestion would naturally and probably result in death" and "it
does not appear that the majority adequately evaluated the risk involved.").
51. Thompson v. Prudential Ins. Co. of Am., 66 S. E.2d 119, 123 (Ga. Ct. App. 1951).
One witness explained how the decedent "could put one bullet in it and spin the cylinder
around and make it hit on the bottom." Id. The decedent "did that five or six times that
night and the bullet always landed on the bottom " so when he "pulled the trigger . . . the
bullet didn't fire." Id.
52. As the witness recalled, "He . . . handed me the gun to me (sic] and I took it in my
hand and looked at it." Id. "I didn't think anything would happen." Id. "He put the pistol to
his own head and pulled the trigger." Id.
53. Id. at 123-24. The court in Thompson proceeded under an accidental-means
framework, an approach to accident-insurance cases discussed infra Section LB. The case
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Insurance Co. v. Harrington, the Ninth Circuit faced a decedent with
gun expertise who shot himself in the head with a "very reliable"
loaded gun which his experience indicated would not fire because it
made a sound consistent with its safety being in place. s4 Finding that
the decedent acted on "reasonable supposition" and that his death was
"unexpected" "[a]s to him," the court granted recovery.ss The problem
is that the Thompson decedent acted on a similarly reasonable
supposition,making his death fairly improbable and unexpected.
Other cases fit this pattern. Courts have allowed recovery for high
risk recreational pastimes like leaping off dams or social activities like
riding drunk and spread-eagle atop a car driven by an intoxicated
compatriot.s6Risks taken in demonstration of one's expertise within a
socially acceptable pastime -like the gun hobbyist described above
-have also counted. By contrast,courts have been unwilling to grant
recovery to mere acts of bravura like russian roulette or lying down at
night in traffic.s7
Courts' tendencies to deny claims in these situations have solid
provenances. Cases involving intentional third-party harms and
suicides illustrate how criminal activity historically led to denials of
recovery. While courts have long held wartime battlefield deaths
accidental, barroom brawlers who picked the fight in which they died
broke the law and often did not recover.ss Similarly, although suicides,

became relevant to determining how high-risk acts of bravura alter the ways courts set the
likelihood of harm necessary to preclude recovery when a Wisconsin appellate cour.: in

v. Washington National Insurance Co. explained the outcome in Thompson, by
reasoning that death from russian roulette was "highly probable or likely." 401 N.W.2d 842,
845 (Wis. Ct. App. 1987). Distinguishing its autoerotic-asphyxiation decedent from the
russian-roulette practitioner in Thompson, the court in Kennedy granted recovery. Id. at 846.

Kennedy

54. N.Y. Life Ins. Co. v. Harrington, 299 F.2d 803, 804-805 & nl (9th Cir. 1962) ("[I]n
order to make this sound with a loaded gun without its discharging, the safety would always
have to be in the 'safe' position just as the sound was made and immediately thereafter.").
55.

Id. at 806.

56. Critchlow III, supra note 25, 378 F.3d 246, 262 (2d Cir. 2004) (explaining that the
accident-insurer defendant conceded that "'extreme-sport' activities" like "cliff rappelling,
rock climbing, and sky-diving" "would not be excluded under the . . . Policy" at issue);
Knight v. Metro. Life Ins. Co., 437 P.2d 417 (Ariz. 1968) (holding an experienced diver's
death attempting to dive off the Coolidge Dam accidental); Ward v. Penn Mut. Life Ins. Co.,
352 S.W.2d 413 (Mo. Ct. App. 1961) (finding an accident after an intoxicated man riding
atop the vehicle his drunken friend drove fell to his death).
57.

See, e.g., Thompson v. Prudential Ins.

Co. of Am., 66 S.E.2d 119 (Ga. Ct. App. 1951)

(russian roulette); Allred v. Prudential Ins. Co., 100 S.E.2d 226 (N.C. 1957) (lying down in
traffic).
58. See, e.g., Runge v. Metro. Life Ins. Co., 537 F.2d 1157, 1159 (4th Cir. 1976) (quoting
Smith v. Combined Ins. Co., 120 S.E.2d 267, 269 (1961)) ("[W]here the insured culpably
provokes the act which causes the injury and death, it is not death by accidental
means . . . . ); Russell S. Baldwin, Comment, Insurance - Accidental Means & Accidental
Death
Harrell v. Minnesota Mutual Life Insurance: Tennessee's Emergence From the
"

-

Serbonian Bog?, 27 U. MEM. L. REV. 745, 756

(1997); cf Scales,

supra note

l, at 238. For an
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which are traditiona ly il legal, have genera ly been uncovered by
accident -insurance po licies, insane decedents who kil l themse vl es are
both e
l ss culpable and have been more likely to recover.59 The line of
cases involving high-risk acts of bravura in which courts have been
reluctant to grant recovery dates to the nineteenth century. In Pollock
v. United States Mutual Accident Association, a Pennsylvania case, a
proprietor offered to treat those in the store to poison.ro Although
warned that the li quid was lethal, the decedent stil l be ileved the
substance was harmless, "laughed[,] and ... drank the balance." 61 He
did not recover.62
Many courts would be uncomfortable with the above analysis. Few
courts have explicit ly discussed the role stigma should play in
accidents, and those that have, have opposed recognizing a stigmatic
aspect of accidents on the grounds that contract a
l w is not normative
and public policy should not app ly.63 These courts have noted that
companies voluntarily issue policies covering a range of savory and
unsavory activities. 64 Because insurers can choose what to include and
exclude, they take on the precise contractual liability delineated in the
po licy. 65 As a result, decedents and their claimants rely on the
de lineated coverage.66 Moreover, hinging accident insurance recovery
on norms affects few behaviors.67 The only victim in most accidentearly case granting recovery to a war victim, see State
(5th Cir. 1920).

Life Insurance Co.

v.

Allison, 269 F. 93

59. Crandal v. Accident Ins. Co., 27 F. 40, 41, 44 (C.C.N.D. Ill. 1886) (explaining its
finding of accidentalness: "Crandal, took his own life by hanging, and . . . at the time of the
act of self-destruction he was insane." " [T]he act was no more attributable to his voluntary
agency than if, as a sane man . . . the same fatality, without co-operation on his part . . . had
overtaken him.").
60. Pollock v. United States Mut. Accident Ass'n, 102 Pa. 230, 232 (1883).
61.

Id.

62.

Id.

at 233.

63. See, e.g. , Ward v. Penn Mut. Life Ins. Co., 352 S.W.2d 413, 423 (Mo. Ct. App. 1961)
(" [O]ur question is a legal, not a moral or philosophical, one . . . . ); Weil v. Fed. Kemper
Life Assurance Co., 866 P.2d 774, 806 (Cal. 1 994) (Mosk, J., dissenting) ("[D]isapproval is
misplaced here.").
"

64. See Weil, 866 P.2d at 806 (Mosk, J., dissenting) ("Nor was the company forced to
issue the policy . . . . ").
65. See, e.g. , Todd I, supra note 7, No. 3:93CV0054-R, 1994 U.S. Dist. LEXIS 21539, at
*38 (1994), modified, 47 F.3d 1448 (5th Cir. 1 995) ("Armed with the knowledge that such
activity occurs, insurance companies cannot cry ignorance or morality in hopes of avoiding
an ambiguous contract which apparently affords coverage.").
66. See Gulf Life Ins. Co. v. Nash, 97 So. 2d 4, 9 (Fla. 1957) (Drew, J., dissenting)
(normative considerations do "violence to the reason for buying accident insurance").
67. The Bird v. John Hancock Mutual Life Insurance Co. court explained, "The
possibility that [recovery] will promote evil or . . . depredations on the public because of the
comforting reassurance that their beneficiaries will collect the insurance if they are killed in
the commission of crime is remote, speculative and theoretical." 320 S.W.2d 955, 958 (Mo.
Ct. App. 1959); see also Weil, 866 P.2d at 823 (Mosk, J., dissenting) ("[N]o one, I submit, has
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in surance ca se s i s the decedent, and the claimant s are generally
innocent of whatever mi sconduct he undertook.68
The problem with the se argument s i s that by oppo sing the
importation of stigmatic con sideration s into a contract they pre sume
the contract doe s not contain them. A better approach i s to a sk
whether lay definition sof accident contain stigmatic a spect s. If so, the
court would not in quire into the pre sence of stigma sbecau se contract
law serve s a normative function or becau se public policy would
thereby be served, but strictly a s relevant to clarifying the lay
definition of accident.
What evidence there i s indicate s laypeople believe stigma s
con stitute one a spect of a definition of accident, but have difficulty
articulating what that a spect i s. In everyday speech, for in stance, it i s
common and natural to speak of an accident' s victim, but awkward
and incongruou sto sugge st that such a victim could al so be culpable or
de spi sed. Merriam-Webster's Collegiate Dictionary define s an accident
a s "an unexpected happening cau sing lo ssor in jury which i snot due to
any fault or mi sconduct on the part of the per son injured" or "an
unfortunate event re sulting e sp[ecially] from carele ssne ss or
ignorance" and without reference to blame.69 When court s have
implicitly allowed moral judgment to color their deci sion s without
explicitly explaining why, they too have indicated stigma' s ill-defined
role.
By only hindering recovery in ca se sinvolving crime sand high-ri sk
act sof bravura, court s choo se a heartland of normative tran sgre ssion s
to which mo st laypeople will attach con siderable stigma s and
tran sform it into the kind of bright-line rule court s can apply quickly
and con si stently. There are good rea son s to believe that mo st people
condemn crime s and high -ri sk act s of bravura. By cri minalizing
activitie s, the state, on behalf of U .S. society a s a whole, stigmatize s

ever been 'encouraged' to engage in the recreational use of cocaine because he believes the
beneficiaries of an insurance policy on his life will be paid more money if he accidentally
overdoses and dies."); Scales, supra note 1, at 302 ("Explicitly stating the 'stupidity penalty'
will likely keep few insureds off the thunderbolt.").
68. See Weil, 866 P.2d at 805 (Mosk, J., dissenting) (in "the insurance context . . . no one
suffers physical harm but the actor"); Hurst, supra note 50, at 858 ("Unlike tort and criminal
law, it is not the insured who benefits from illegal actions, but the innocent beneficiary.").
69. MERRIAM-WEBSTER'S COLLEGIATE DICTIONARY, supra note 37, at 7; see also THE
AMERICAN HERITAGE DICTIONARY OF THE ENGLISH LANGUAGE, supra note 37, at 10-11
(defining accident as "[a]n unexpected and undesirable event" and not as a blameless one); 1
note 26, at 74 (defining accident as " [a]nything
that happens without foresight or expectation; an unusual event, which proceeds from some
unknown cause, or is an unusual effect of a known cause; a casualty, a contingency" and not
as requiring blamelessness); RANDOM HOUSE WEBSTER'S UNABRIDGED DICTIONARY,
supra note 37, at 12 (defining accident as both "an undesirable or unfortunate happening"
and "Law. such a happening resulting in injury that is in no way the fault of the injured
person for which compensation or indemnity is legally sought").

THE OXFORD ENGLISH DICTIONARY, supra
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and condemns them.70 It thus predefines the transgressions as
outweighing their mitigating components. No such definitive
condemnation reaches decedents who mi x high doses of prescription
drugs with alcohol. High-risk acts of bravura represent stigmatized
activities with no mitigating component. As one court reviewing
denials of recovery in cases of russian roulette e xplained, such
"bizarre " acts show "reckless abandon " and are "courting death. "71
The implication is that the act is not only dangerous and widely
stigmatized, but also has no redeeming traits.
Moreover, it makes sense that courts do not further e xpand the
range of stigma cases in which they hinder recovery. Although courts
often talk about single, consensus lay definitions of words, a more
realistic model recognizes that various laypeople define words
differently. This diversity could be e xpansive in cases involving stigma
because different individuals will attach stigmas to different activities,
and in varied degrees. It would be untenable for courts to sort through
this large, shifting, and comple x array of moral and social judgments
case by case.
It is now possible to evaluate the way courts have treated the
stigma that attaches to acts of autoerotic asphy xiation. Many courts
have raised it in dicta, comparing the practice to a crime or high -risk
act of bravura. They have thereby analogized autoerotic-asphy xiation
cases to the stigma cases in which they have hindered recovery. While
such comparisons have some initial appeal, a more formal approach
reveals that autoerotic asphy xiation is neither a crime nor a high-risk
act of bravura, and conse quently should not face the less forgiving
standards courts reserve for those cases.
Courts deciding autoerotic-asphy xiation cases have usually
observed or described the practice's stigmatized aspects. 72 The federal

70. See, e.g., Lawrence v. Texas, 539 U.S. 558, 571, 575-76 (2003) (describing how "the
majority . . . use[s] the power of the State to enforce [their] views on the whole society
through operation of the criminal law," highlighting " [t]he stigma . . . criminal statute[s]
imposeO" and what "a criminal offense . . . imports for the dignity of the person charged,"
and "underscor[ing] the consequential nature of the punishment and the state-sponsored
condemnation attendant to the criminal prohibition").
71. Kennedy v. Wash. Nat'l Ins. Co., 401 N.W.2d 842, 845 (Wis. Ct. App. 1987).
72. Compare infra notes 73-84 (including cases that raise stigma) and accompanying
text, with supra notes 1 1 , 24-25, and infra notes 1 18-119, 1 23-125 (listing all published
autoerotic-asphyxiation accident-insurance cases besides International Underwriters, Inc. v.
Home Insurance Co., 500 F. Supp. 637 (E.D. Va. 1 980)). In denying recovery, courts hint
that they are considering factors other than likelihood of harm by describing the injury's
foreseeability in terms of immediacy and tangibility as well as probability. See Cronin v.
Zurich Am. Ins. Co., 189 F. Supp. 2d 29, 37 (S.D.N.Y. 2002) (describing "an imminent
danger that consciousness will be Jost and death will result"); id. ("One who purposefully
creates the conditions of risk foresees the logical consequence of risk, and has to assume that
he may not be able to manage those conditions so as to eliminate the risk he has created.");
Sigler I, supra note 28, 506 F. Supp. 542, 544 (S.D. Iowa 1981), affd, 663 F.2d 49 (8th Cir.
1981) ("[A] reasonable person would comprehend and foresee that placing a noose around
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district co urt in Todd v. AIG Life Insurance Co. , for instance, opened
its opinion with a disc ussion of the diffic ulties posed by the "prej udice,
disg ust and c uriosity " with which most peop le view a utoerotic
asphyxiation and frank ly acknow ledged that it fo und the practice
unsett ling. 73 These reactions, it exp a
l ined , e
l d to "inf a
l mmatory
rhetoric " and made it diffic ult to understand the preva lence or
dangers of the practice.74 Less sympathetic co urts have unnecessari ly
rehashed tawdry evidence of death-scene cross-dressing,pornography,
and sex ua l deviance ; more circ umspect ones have described the
practice as un us ua ,
l bizarre, a menta l i llness, and foo ilsh, or have
ca lled the res ults awry, unfort unate,and tragic. 75

his neck and subsequently hanging himself with the noose for the purpose of inducing
asphyxia could result in his death.").
73. Todd I, supra note 7, No. 3:93CV0054-R, 1994 U.S. Dist. LEXIS 21539 (N.D. Tex.
1994), at *l, modified, 47 F.3d 1448 (5th Cir. 1995) ("prejudice, disgust and curiosity"); id. at
*38 ("It is very difficult to understand or appreciate how any individual could put themselves
at great risk to engage in autoerotic acts.").
74. Id. at *l, *20-*21 & n.23. The court elaborated: "The greatest barrier to any real
body of knowledge on the subject is the stigma which accompanies such a death." Id. at *20.
Because "people were ashamed . . . of the connotations of sexual abnormality," "most
relatives 'preferred not to have [their relative's death] known to be an autoerotic death"'
and "'[m]any went to lengths to disguise any telltale signs,' so as to prevent detection." Id. at
*21 (quoting Dr. William Enos, former medical examiner for the state of Virginia, quoted in
Seigenthaler, supra note 7, at 7). Thus, "in many cases, the researchers believe, these deaths
are mislabeled suicide, sometimes after horrified parents have removed all evidence of the
sexual nature of their child's death." Id. at *21 n.23 (quoting Jane E. Brody, Autoerotic
Death of Youths Causes Widening Concern, N.Y. TIMES, Mar. 27, 1984, at Cl).
75. See Runge v. Metro. Life Ins. Co., 537 F.2d 1157, 1 158 (4th Cir. 1976) (quoting the
trial court) (describing autoerotic asphyxiation as "unusual" and "very bizarre"); MAMSI
III, supra note 1 1 , 825 A.2d 995, 996 (Md. 2003) (describing same "as a mental disorder
falling into the category of 'Sexual Masochism"'); Parker v. Danaher Corp., 851 F. Supp.
1287, 1295 (W.D. Ark. 1994) (quoting Conn. Gen. Life Ins. Co. v. Tommie, 619 S.W.2d 199,
202 (Tex. App. 1981)) (describing same as "foolish"); Am. Bankers Ins. Co. v. Gilberts, 181
F.3d 931, 932 (8th Cir. 1999) (footnote omitted) (finding "autoerotic asphyxia gone awry");
Todd II, supra note 11, 47 F.3d 1448, 1450 (5th Cir. 1995) (seeing an "unfortunate death");
Critchlow II, supra note 9, 340 F.3d 130, 1 3 1 (2d Cir. 2003) (" [A] postmortem photograph
taken by the police [is] a tragic depiction that speaks for itself."), vacated and rev'd, 378 F.3d
246 (2d Cir. 2004); Bennett v. Am Int'I Life Assurance Co., 956 F. Supp. 201, 203 (N.D.N.Y.
1 997) (cross-dressing); Parker, 851 F. Supp. at 1289 (same); Tommie, 619 S.W.2d at 201
(same); Kennedy v. Wash. Nat'! Ins. Co., 401 N.W.2d 842, 844 (Wis. Ct. App. 1987)
(pornography); Fawcett v. Metro. Life Ins. Co., No. C-3-97-540, 2000 U.S. Dist. LEXIS
10061, at *4 (S.D. Ohio June 28, 2000) (same); MAMSI Ill, supra note 1 1 , 825 A.2d 995, 997
(same); Hamilton v. AIG Life Ins. Co., 182 F. Supp. 2d 39, 41-42 (D.D.C. 2002) (bondage
paraphernalia); Lonergan v. Reliance Std. Life Ins. Co., No. CV-96-1 1832-PBS, 1997 U.S.
Dist. LEXIS 24075, at *5 (D. Mass. May 29, 1997) (noting that investigators "also discovered
in Mr. Lonergan's house forty-three video tapes involving sadomasochism and other items
associated with sadomasochistic practices"); cf Padfield v. AIG Life Ins. Co., 290 F.3d 1 121,
1 124 (9th Cir. 2002) (explaining that decedent's wife "told officers that she knew of her
husband's sexual devices but thought he had quit using them"); Cronin v. Zurich Am Ins.
Co., 189 F. Supp. 2d 29, 32 (S.D.N.Y. 2002) (describing how the police found a decedent
"hanging naked in a sitting position, his buttocks suspended approximately 10 centimeters
above the floor").
.

.
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In elucidating arguments denying recovery, courts have
rhetorically linked autoerotic asphyxiation to images of criminality
and violent bravura.76 Some have overtly connected crime and
autoerotic as phyxiation by arguing that the decedent s' temporary loss
of oxygen was due to an intentional action and is thus similar to
strangulation by an attacker. 77 In Runge v. Metropolitan Life Insurance
Co. , the Fourth Circuit drew an analogy between the autoerotic
asphyxiation decedent before it and victims who provoke the attacks
that kill them when it denied the former recovery under the standard
courts use in cases involving the latter.78
In the autoerotic-asphyxiation case of Kennedy v. Washington
National Insurance Co. , a Wisconsin appellate court presented one
form that an analogy between autoerotic as phyxiation and high-risk
acts of bravura can take. 79 Discussing russian roulette, it wrote,
"reckless abandon and exposure to a known and obvious danger
cannot be said to have been accidental " and therefore, "[o]ne
engaging in such a bizarre act as Russian Roulette knows that he is
courting death or severe injury, and will be held to have intended such
obvious and well known results if he is killed or injured." 80 While the
court ultimately granted recovery by distinguishing russian roulette
and autoerotic as phyxiation,81 its reasoning' reveals why it raised the
comparison and how a less sym pathetic court might use it to deny
recovery. The words and phrases that the court used to describe the
risky and irredeemable aspects of russian roulette - reckless
abandon,danger, bizarre and courting death -can also be ap plied to
autoerotic as phyxiation. One could use the analogy to characterize
autoerotic as phyxiation as a large risk undertaken for its own sake,
and thus deny recovery.

76. For example, the court in
the practice when it described:

MAMSI III focused

on the violence and risk inherent in

a yellow 114" synthetic rope attached to the loop binding the hands with a quick release knot
secured by a wooden clothes pin. This rope was attached to a pulley to the above-mentioned
leather belt around the neck . . . tension [was] applied to the neck loops and wrists. The legs
were tied at the level of the malleoli [ankle bones] with four loops of 114" cotton rope tied
between the legs, with transverse loops forming a Figure "8" knot . . . .

MAMSI III, supra note 1 1 , 825 A.2d at 997 n.1 (quoting The Report of the Post Mortem
Examination, dated 1 1 October 2000) (final alteration and final omission in original).
77. See Critchlow /, supra note 5, 198 F. Supp. 2d 318, 323 (W.D.N.Y. 2002) ("decedent
intentionally constricted his windpipe"), affd, 340 F.3d 130 (2d Cir. 2003), vacated and rev'd,
378 F.3d 246 (2d Cir. 2004); Sims v. Monumental Gen. Ins. Co., 960 F.2d 478, 480 (5th Cir.
1992) [hereinafter Sims II] ("If . . . a robber had partially strangled [the decedent], we would
have no trouble holding . . . the robber . . . criminally liable.").
78. 537 F.2d 1 157, 1 1 59 (4th Cir. 1976).
79. 401 N.W.2d 842 (Wis. Ct. App. 1987).
80.

Id. at 845.

81. Id.
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Courts ha ve implicitly reinforced and rehearsed arguments linking
autoerotic asphyxiation to crimes and high-risk acts of bra vura
through voyeuristic descriptions of unsa vory scenes of death. Some
ha ve luridly detailed e vidence of trans vestitism, bondage or
masochism paraphernalia, and pornographic materials at the scene of
death.82 Others ha ve labeled the cause of death an intentional act of
hanging and describe instruments used to temporarily restrict oxygen
flow to the brain as weapons.83 This violent imagery and cataloging of
unsa vory and marginal sexual accoutrements both links autoerotic
asphyxiation to murder rhetorically and deprecates its benefits or
importance for practitioners.84

82. Speaking of cross-dressing in Connecticut General Life Insurance Co. v. Tommie, the
court noted that the decedent had "dressed himself in [his wife's] wig, bra, nightie and
panties." 619 S.W.2d 199, 201 (Tex. App. 1981); see also Bennett v. Am . Int'! Life Assurance
Co., 956 F. Supp. 201, 203 (N.D.N.Y. 1997) ("[The decedent] was clad in blue and brown
pantyhose; . . . [a] brown stocking covered his head . . . . "); Parker v. Danaher Corp., 851 F.
Supp. 1287, 1289 (W.D. Ark. 1994) (quoting a police department report) ("The deceased
had what appeared to be two soft balls inserted up his shirt around the breast area indicating
the appearance of female breast (sic)." ("(sic)" in original)). The court in Lonergan v.
Reliance Standard Life Insurance Co. observed that the decedent had forty-three video tapes
involving sadomasochism and other items associated with sadomasochistic practices in his
house. No. CV-96-11832-PBS, 1997 U.S. Dist. LEXIS 24075, at *5 (D. Mass. May 29, 1997);
see also Todd II, supra note 11, 47 F.3d 1448, 1450 (5th Cir. 1995) ("[The decedent] was lying
on his bed with a studded dog collar around his neck; the collar, in turn, was attached to two
leather leashes . . . . "); Hamilton v. AIG Life Ins. Co., 182 F. Supp. 2d 39, 41-42 (D.D.C.
2002) (decedent had a "bondage collar around his neck . . . [, was] naked, except for a pair of
wool socks, and was kneeling in front of mirrors with a pair of combat boots in front of
him"). In Kennedy v. Washington National Insurance Co. the court recalled that "[v]arious
pictures of the lower portion of animals and nude males were displayed on a wall near the
shower." 401 N.W.2d at 845; see also MAMSI Ill, supra note 11, 825 A.2d 995, 997 (Md.
2003) (quoting The Report of the Post Mortem Examination, dated 11 October 2000) ("The
wall opposite the body was covered 'with a large amount of centerfold pictures of naked
females."').
83. In International Underwriters, Inc. v. Home Insurance Co. , the court described a
"hangmen's noose." 662 F.2d 1084, 1085 (4th Cir. 1981); see also Fawcett v. Metro. Life Ins.
Co., 2000 U.S. Dist. LEXIS 10061, at *4 (S.D. Ohio June 28, 2000) ("After making a noose
from a towel and attaching it to a rope, he tied the other end of the rope to a closet rod and
placed the towel around his neck . . . . "); Runge v. Metro. Life Ins. Co., 537 F.2d 1157, 1158
(4th Cir. 1976) (quoting the trial court) ("The decedent had tied the electrical extension cord
[and] . . . placed the noose formed . . . around his neck . . . . "); Bennett, 956 F. Supp. at 203
("[A] plastic bag covered the [decedent's head], and a green tie was loosely looped around
his head with a slip knot."). A decedent "hanging by his neck, suspended from a luggage
strap looped to a hook on the bathroom door" appeared in Cronin v. Zurich American
Insurance Co., 189 F. Supp. 2d 29, 31 (S.D.N.Y. 2002); see also Sigler II, supra note 12, 663
F.2d 49, 49 n.2 (8th Cir. 1981).
84. In describing autoerotic-asphyxiation-death scenes in ways that stress images of
criminality and depravity, courts have reflected both the secondary sources available on the
topic and the images that death scene photographs would depict. The few hits that searches
on ProQuest, J-Stor and WorldCat produce, for instance, either link autoerotic asphyxiation
to criminal activity or sexual dysfunction. See, e.g. , Todd McCarthy, Ken Park, VARIETY,
Sept. 9-15, 2002, at 33 (describing KEN PARK (Cinea/Kees Kasander 2002)) ("The picture
begins with the title character blowing his brains out one sunny day at a park. Then
there's . . . the autoerotic asphyxiation freak who masturbates in loving close-up before
stabbing his grandparents to death in their bed . . . . "); Robert Harris, Major's School for
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But autoeroti c asphyxiation is neither a crime nor an a ct of
bravura, and courts' comparisons thereto thus fall short. Autoeroti c
asphyxiation and criminal battery may both involve nooses,
physiologi cal effe cts (su ch as the deprivation of oxygen), s cenes of
death,and individuals who engage in other,related marginal a ctivities.
But only criminal battery, and not autoeroti c asphyxiation, violates
another person's bodily integrity against her will or is against the law. 85
High-risk a cts of bravura like russian roulette also di ffer from
autoeroti casphyxiation. Courts disapprove of high-risk a cts of bravura
be cause they weigh an elevated probability of harm against the cheap
thrill of demonstrating one's risk toleran ce in front of others.86 By
contrast, similarly risky a ctivities that combine so cial displays of risk
toleran ce with other, more a cceptable a ctivities, su ch as re creation,
so cializing, or a hobby, have provided a basis for re covery. Be cause
autoeroti casphyxiation is by definition performed alone,pra ctitioners
do not undertake the con comitant risk for so cial display.87Rather, the
risk forms a component of a sexual pra cti ce common to a variety of
cultures and histori cal moments. 88

Scandal, VANITY FAIR, Apr. 1994, at 134 (describing the negative impact of autoerotic
asphyxiation scandals, among others, on John Major's Conservative Party); Autoerotic
Asphyxiation: Still a Mysterious Practice, MEDICAL POST, Feb. 18, 1992, at 40. Psychological
publications often also characterize autoerotic asphyxiation as a fo rm of sexual masochism
or dysfunction. See, e.g., AMERICAN PSYCHIATRIC ASSOCIATION, supra note 6, § 302.83
(describing autoerotic asphyxiation as a form of sexual masochism). More common appear
to be articles in forensic journals. See Craig M. Cooley, Autoerotic Deaths: Historical
Perspectives and Investigative Consideration, 2 J. BEHAV. PROFILING (2001) (reviewing
numerous such sources), http://www.Jaw-forensic.com/autoerotic.htm; Andrew P. Jenkins,
Ph.D., CHES, EMT, When Self-Pleasuring Becomes Self-Destruction: Autoerotic
Asphyxiation Paraphilia, 3 lNT'L E LECTRONIC J. HEALTH EDUC. 208, 214-15 (2000) , at
http://www.aahperd.org/iejhe/archive/jenkins.pdf (same). Police photographs of autoerotic
asphyxiation-death scenes further strengthen the link between such acts and criminality or
depravity. See, e.g., Andrew P. Jenkins, Ph.D., CHES, EMT, Autoerotic Asphyxia Paraphilia
Presentation on Powerpoint (unpublished PowerPoint presentation), at http://
www.cwu.edu/-jenkinsa/AEA.htm (last visited Dec. 14, 2003).
85. For a more in-depth discussion, see infra Part II.
86. See supra note 71 and accompanying text.
87. See, e.g., Critchlow II, supra note 9, 340 F.3d 130, 132 (2d Cir. 2003) ("[The
decedent] retired to his locked bedroom in his parents' empty house, disrobed completely
and attached an intricate, home-made harness consisting of ropes, weights, and counter
weights leading to a noose around his neck."), vacated and rev'd, 378 F.3d 246 (2d Cir. 2004).
88. The Todd I court presented a rare opinion discussing its roots and spread: "[T]he
practice may date as far back as 1000 AD. with the Ancient Mayans" and "autoerotic
activity is a relatively common practice among Eskimos and Far Eastern couples." Supra
note 7, No. 3:93CV0054-R, 1994 U.S. Dist. LEXIS 21539, at *22 (N.D. Tex. Mar. 24, 1994),
modified, 47 F.3d 1448 (5th Cir. 1995). Cummings et al. also summarize instances of
autoerotic asphyxiation in various cultures:
Inuit children have been known to play a sexual game where they strangle each other; it is
also said to be a frequent sexual practice among Asians to grasp the partner's throat in a
strangling manner. The practice has also been described in the Yaghans of South America,
the Celts, and the Shoshone-Bannock Indians.
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The Supreme Court has suggested the value of such individual
sexual practices. In a series of cases culminating in Lawrence v. Texas,
it has indicated that many forms of sexua l activity fal l within the
fundamental right to privacy protected under the Fourteenth
Amendment to the United States Constitution.89 Although the Court
has not held that autoerotic activities fall within the scope of this
fundamental right to privacy, they have indicated the importance of
sexual expression to individuals' dignity, autonomy, and identity.90
Supra note 8 (citations omitted). They also review its history in the West, observing that
" English brothels reportedly experimented with the act of hanging as a cure for impotence in
the 1600's," that "[i]n the late 1700's a Czechoslovakian musician . . . often requested
prostitutes to hang him, sometimes for up to five minutes," that "[r]eports of autoerotic
fatalities began to appear in the medical literature around 1856," and that " [t]he Marquis de
Sade described in great detail the act of sexual asphyxiation in the book 'Justine."' Id.
89. Lawrence v. Texas, 539 U.S. 558, 574, 562, 567 (2003) (protecting adult consensual
sexual intimacy while explaining "that our laws and tradition afford constitutional protection
to personal decisions relating to marriage, procreation, contraception, family relationships,
child rearing, and education" and that "[i]n our tradition the State is not omnipresent in the
home," "the most private of places"); Planned Parenthood v. Casey, 505 U.S. 833, 856 (1992)
(upholding the right to choose by explaining "that for two decades . . . people have
organized intimate relationships and made choices that define their views of themselves and
their places in society, in reliance on the availability of abortion in the event that
contraception should fail."); Eisenstadt v. Baird, 405 U.S. 438 (1972) (contraceptives for
unmarried couples); Griswold v. Connecticut, 381 U.S. 479 (1965) (contraceptives for
married couples).
90. Lawrence, 539 U.S. 558 (2003) (citing other relevant cases). In striJ.cing Texas's
criminalization of same-sex sexual conduct, the Court quoted Planned Parenthood on the
connection between certain sexual activities and self determination:
These [are] matters[] involving the most intimate and personal choices a person may make in
a lifetime, choices central to personal dignity and autonomy, are central to the liberty
protected by the Fourteenth Amendment. At the heart of liberty is the right to define one's
own concept of existence of meaning, of the universe, and of the mystery of human life.
Beliefs about these matters . . . define the attributes of personhood . . . .

Id. at 574 (quoting Planned Parenthood, 505 U.S. at 851). The Court was somewhat unclear
as to whether all sexual activity or only interpersonal sexual activity fell within the above
reasoning. In some places it focused on the interrelationships and social identities produced
by homosexual sexual activity by noting the role sexuality can play as "one element in a
personal bond that is more enduring," id. at 567, that certain "sexual practices [are] common
to a homosexual lifestyle," id. at 578, and that statutes condemning such activities "seek to
control a personal relationship," id. at 558. But the Court also spoke to sexual activity more
broadly, identifying, "the most private human conduct [as] sexual behavior." Id.; see also id.
at 590 (Scalia, J., dissenting) (arguing that the majority's reasoning appears to extend similar
protections to masturbation); Gary D. Allison, Sanctioning Sodomy: The Supreme Court
Liberates Gay Sex and Limits State Power to Vindicate the Moral Sentiments of the People, 39
TULSA L. REV. 95, 148 (2003) ("It is . . . quite predictable that bans on masturbation will
soon fall."); Dana Neacsu, Tempest in a Teacup or the Mystique of Sexual Legal Discourse,
38 GONZ. L. REV 601, 603 (2002) (claiming commentators have already shown that
masturbation is a constitutionally protected activity). More frequently, the Court
simultaneously referred to sexual behavior and interpersonal relations as "sexual intimacy,"
"consensual sexual intimacy," and "intimate sexual conduct." Lawrence, 539 U.S. at 564,
566. In so doing, it suggested that both sexual activity and social relations drive self
determination, and that when they intersect in a private setting like the home they fall within
the "right to liberty under the Due Process Clause." Id. at 578; cf Arthur S. Leonard,
Lawrence v. Texas and the New Law of Gay Rights, 30 OHIO N.U. L. REV. 189, 208 (2004)
(suggesting that masturbation may be encompassed by the majority's reasoning); Jami
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Practitioners echo such sentiments, valuing the activity highly enough
to undertake its associated risks. Thus, like a high-risk recreation
activity, and unlike a mere act of bravura, practitioners of autoerotic
asphyxiation do not expose themselves to risk merely for its own
sake .91 Rather, they pursue a form of pleasure and identity with
socially beneficial aspects. Analogy to bravura fails . Because
autoerotic asphyxiation is neither a crime nor a high-risk act of
bravura, and because death is not the expected result of the practice,
courts should grant recovery in autoerotic-asphyxiation cases.
B.

Accidental-Means Analysis Does Not Provide
a Viable Alternative Analysis

A minority of jurisdictions decide accident-insurance cases under
an approach that differs from those proposed and discussed above :
"accidental-means analysis. "92 This once-dominant approach
distinguishes insurance policies covering "accidental deaths "and those
covering "death by accidental means."93 Reasoning that "accidental "

Weinstein & Tobyn DeMarco, Challenging Dissent: The Ontology and Logic of Lawrence v.
Texas, 10 CARDOZO WOMEN'S L.J. 423, 437-440 & n.62 (2004) (same); Calvin Massey, The
New Formalism: Requiem for Tiered Scrutiny?, 6 U. PA. J. CONST. L. 945, 965 (2004)
(arguing that masturbation laws seem likely to fall, but acknowledging the possibility of an
injury-to-actor argument).
91. See supra note 5. But cf Bennett v. Am. Int'I Life Assurance Co., 956 F. Supp. 201,
211 (N.D.N.Y. 1997) ("[T]he pursuit of a practice bordering on a near fatal outcome is a
significant part of the pleasure and gratification associated with the act." (quoting Miskin
Aff. 'lI 4)).
92. Compare Weil v. Fed. Kemper Life Assurance Co., 866 P.2d 774, 781 (Cal. 1994)
(citing 3 HARNETT & LESNICK, THE LAW OF LIFE AND HEALTH INSURANCE § 7.03(1), at 724 to 7-29 (1992)) ("(A]s of 1992, 22 jurisdictions, including California, expressly recognized
the distinction between 'accidental means' and 'accidental death . . . . ) with Weil, 866 P.2d
at 798 (Mosk, J., dissenting) (raising questions as to the majority's total without challenging
its general thrust) and Scales, supra note 1, 262-63, 266 (claiming that foreseeability tests
constitute the majority rule).
"'

93. Scales, supra note 1, at 234 (explaining that in accident-insurance policies, the
phrasing: "'external, violent and accidental means[]' . . . was practically universal by 1925,
and (that] few cases are found during this period involving policies departing from this
language" (quoting CORNELIUS, supra note 1, at ii)); id. at 262-63 (stating that accidental
means analysis was widely, if unevenly, applied during the interwar period). Many
jurisdictions combine foreseeability analysis and accidental-means analysis under the single
heading of accidental means. See, e.g. , Fawcett v. Metro. Life Ins. Co., No. C-3-97-540, 2000
U.S. Dist. LEXIS 10061, at *10 (S.D. Ohio June 28, 2000) (quoting Linden Motor Freight
Co. v. Travelers Ins. Co., 40 N.J. 511, 515 (1963)) ("(C]ourts interpreting accidental means
provisions have allowed recovery for conduct entirely voluntary and intentional 'if, in the act
which precedes the injury, something unforeseen, unexpected or unusual occurs which
produces the injury."'). For example, in defending its continued application of accidental
means analysis, the California Supreme Court observed that "a number of California
decisions have focused particularly upon whether the insured's voluntary act itself is such
that its common, natural, or probable consequence would be to visit injury or death upon the
insured." Weil, 866 P.2d at 779, 783 ("(T]he approach . . . is to consider the probability of the
result in deciding whether the voluntary action of the insured preceding the injury can
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modifi es "m eans," th es e co urts h av e r eq uir ed th at th e accid ent al
asp ect of a d eath also b e its m eans. 94 By th en confl ating m eans and
c aus e, th ey h av e t urn ed th e in q uiry aw ay from wh eth er th e r es ult inj ury or d eath - w as accid ent al and tow ard wh eth er som e action
prior to th er es ult w as accid ent ally und ert ak en.95 To disting uish,co urts
h av e r eason ed th at mish aps or invol unt ary, unint ention al actions th at
constitute 'accidental means."'). This Note addresses courts that purport to look to
foreseeability supra Section I.A.
94. See, e.g., Landress v. Phoenix Mut. Life Ins. Co., 291 U.S. 491, 496 (1934) ("The
stipulated payments are to be made only if the bodily injury, though unforeseen, is effected
by means which are external and accidental."). The argument rests on the intuition that
fidelity to contracts' language mandates the approach. Because some, but not all, accident
insurance policies limit coverage to only injuries caused by accidental means, one can read
the difference as a distinction for which the parties have contracted and to which courts
should give effect. See, e.g., Weil, 866 P.2d at 779 ("A differentiation is made . . . between the
result to the insured and the means which is the operative cause in producing this result.").
The argument, however, contains a flaw: different words need not have different
meanings. As noted in the Introduction, courts generally insist that they give terms their lay
meanings. Here, it seems unlikely that laypeople would distinguish between accidental
means and accidental results. In Nash the court noted that the distinction between accidental
means and results is sufficiently elusive that "even the most learned judge or lawyer, in
attempting to understand and comprehend the niceties of the distinction, is left in a state of
bewilderment and confusion." 97 So. 2d 4, 10 (Fla. 1957); see also, e.g., Bennett v. Am. Int']
Life Assurance Co., 956 F. Supp. 201, 206 (N.D.N.Y. 1997) ("The fine distinction between
'accidental death' and 'death from accidental means' would certainly never occur to an
ordinary policy holder." (quoting 10 COUCH ON INSURANCE 2d § 41:31 (1982))). It is also a
distinction few insureds would expect to find in an accident-insurance policy. See, e.g.,
Knight v. Metro. Life Ins. Co., 437 P.2d 416, 420 ("One paying the premium for a policy
which insures against 'death by accidental means' intends to provide benefits to his family or
named beneficiary in the event he should suffer death caused by accident as opposed to
death caused by other means, such as suicide, murder, disease or natural death.").
The reasonableness of the insured's confusion is compounded by the fact that many
potential insureds do not read their own, often long and complex policies, Roger C.
Henderson, The Doctrine of Reasonable Expectations in Insurance Law After Two Decades,
51 OHIO ST. L.J. 823, 840 (1990), much less those of their competitors. Thomas Corcoran, a
Principal at Towers Perrin, explains that few potential insureds read competing policies
before making a decision. Interview with Thomas Corcoran, Principal, Towers Perrin,
Centerville, Mass. (Aug. 27, 2003).
Vindicating insured confusion also makes sense in this context because, as the drafters of
accident-insurance policies, insurers have the ability to frame their contracts in clear,
comprehensible terms. See Knight, 437 P.2d at 420 ("Insurance companies are the drafters of
the policies they sell and if they want to exclude against reckless and foolhardy acts . . . they
have it in their power to make such exclusions.").
95. The court in Ward v. Penn Mutual Life Insurance Co., 352 S.W.2d 413, 420 (Mo. Ct.
App. 1961), illustrated the conflation of means and cause: "[I]t is necessary to bear in mind
that 'means,' as used in policy provisions such as those under consideration, is equivalent to
'cause . . . . " In reasserting its fidelity to accidental-means jurisprudence, the California
Supreme Court showed how this conflation deemphasizes results when it reasoned that such
policies "preclude coverage for voluntary and intentional conduct that results in unintended
death." Weil, 866 P.2d at 780; see also Gordon v. Metro. Life Ins. Co., 260 A.2d 338, 339 (Md.
1970) ("[A] means is not made accidental . . . merely because death results unexpectedly.").
The distinction generally reframes the inquiry as a search for an accident that precedes
injury. See, e.g., Olson v. Am. Bankers Ins. Co., 35 Cal. Rptr. 2d 897, 899 (Cal. Ct. App.
1994) ("[T]here must be some element of unexpectedness in the preceding act or occurrence
which leads to the injury or death."); cf Scales, supra note 1, at 234 ("[U]npleasant results
stemming from nonaccidental means [a]re not covered.").
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lead to unforeseen deaths and injuries - like stumbling while
descending from a platform - qualify, but voluntary actions that tum
out badly -like russian roulette -do not. 96
This approach does not represent a viable alternative to the
approach this Note advocates because the distinction proponents of
accidental-means analysis have favored cannot be made. 97 Accidental
means analysis has proven unworkable and has been inconsistently
applied .98 In some cases courts have been unable to locate the line
between means and results, and where courts have applied the test,
they have produced obscurely argued and conflicting opinions. 99
Future courts have received little principled precedent from which to
reason. 100
The distinction between an accidental result and cause is false. In a
strict sense,most,if not all,accidents include nonaccidental causes. To
96. The Laney v. Continental Insurance Co. court provided an example in its summary
of Georgia law: "Where an unusual or unexpected result occurs, by reason of the doing of an
intentional act, with no mischance, slip or mishap occurring in doing the act itself, the
ensuing injury or death is not caused by accidental means." 757 F.2d 1190, 1191 (11th Cir.
1985) (quoting Jackson v. Nat'! Life & Accident Ins. Co., 202 S.E.2d 711, 712 (Ga. Ct. App.
1973)) (citations omitted). It also wrote that "for an injury to result from accidental means, it
must be the unexpected result of an unforeseen or unexpected act which was involuntarily
and unintentionally done." Id. (quoting Johnson v. Nat'! Life & Accident Ins. Co., 90 S.E.2d
36, 37 (Ga. Ct. App. 1955)). Professor Scales describes this as a "distinction between when
someone . . . has done something incorrectly, which may seem accidental, and when
something unpleasant has merely happened to the insured." Scales, supra note 1, at 208.
While this standard for policies requiring "accidental means" tends to narrow coverage,
courts that utilize it generally become lenient in the face of accident-insurance policies that
do not specifically mandate such means. See, e.g. , Olson, 35 Cal. Rptr. 2d at 899 (quoting
Weil, 866 P.2d at 774) (citations omitted in original) (summarizing California jurisprudence
to the effect that '"policies requiring only that there be proof of accidental death have been
construed broadly, "such that the injury or death is likely to be covered unless the insured
virtually intended his injury or death'""). For examples, see United States Mutual Accident
Association v. Barry, 131 U.S. 100 (1889), where the insured stumbled while descending from
a platform, and Thompson v. Prudential Insurance Co. of America, 66 S.E.2d 119 (Ga. Ct.
App. 1951), a russian-roulette case.
97. Gulf Life Ins. Co. v. Nash, 97 So. 2d 4, 10 (Fla. 1957) (Drew, J., dissenting) (calling
the distinction between accidental means and results "a distinction without a difference").
98. As Justice Cardozo wrote, accidental-means analysis "will plunge this branch of the
law into a Serbonian Bog." Landress v. Phoenix Mut. Life Ins. Co., 291 U.S. 491, 499 (1934)
(Cardozo, J., dissenting) ("The proposed distinction will not survive . . . application . . . . ").
99. See Nash, 97 So. 2d at 8 (Drew, J., dissenting) ("This line of cases has created a
morass of decisions which have become shrouded in a semantic and polemical maze . . . . ");
Gordon, 260 A.2d at 340 (affirming accidental-means analysis while admitting that
" (p]erhaps in some cases there is no way to distinguish").
100. See Nash, 97 So. 2d at 8 (Drew, J., dissenting) (describing available precedents as
"almost a wilderness of cases in which varying facts and situations have been applied to
varying principles" (quoting McCullough v. Liberty Life Ins. Co., 264 P. 65, 67 (Kan. 1928))).
Nonetheless, some courts have claimed that continued application of the test indicates that
history has proven the distinction's feasibility. See Gordon, 260 A.2d at 341 ("(T]he
distinction between accidental means and accidental results has been recognized and
applied."); Equitable Life Assurance Soc'y v. Hemenover, 67 P.2d 80, 82 (Colo. 1937)
("Respectable authority thus appears on both sides of this question.").
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the e xtent that a result is unforeseen and unintended, it must result
from an activity not undertaken as desired. 101 Consider a patient who
takes an antibiotic to which she subse quently discovers she is allergic.
If the accident is not in the taking of the pill,it is as if the accident lies
in the pill itself. This artificially inserts an alien,intervening cause.102 In
any event,most would deem the allergic reaction an accident.
The same point can be made by observing that while causes a nd
results may differ as a general matter, it is meaningless to s peak of
both accidental causes and accidental results.By definition, accidents
are unintentional.103 In every case, events must go awry and injury
must follow. Deciding how to characterize this stream of events whether to include the intermediate divergence into the prior action
or the subse quent result -is mere framing.
A few e xam ples will illustrate. In Linden Motor Freight Co. v.
Travelers Insurance Co. , the decedent avoided a collision with another
fire truck by jerking the steering wheel, thereby causing a strain that
killed him almost immediately. 104 The New Jersey court described t his
as a "s pontaneous reaction," im plicitly involuntary and thus
covered. 105But one might also say that the decedent a p peared to drive
as intended,and was in fact able to quite agilely avoid an accident. By
framing it this way, the near accident becomes the une xpected result
of the voluntary act of driving and the jerk and resultant death merely
e xtensions thereof.
This problem eve n a p pears in the doctrine's foundational cases.
The Su preme Court first promoted accidental-means analysis in
United States Mutual Accident Association v. Barry, a nineteenth 
century case involvi ng a man who jum ped from a platform to t he
ground and subse quently discovered he had injured himself. 106 The
court presumed the decedent intended to land safely and thus viewed
his injury as evidence of a misha p. 107 One is left to wonder whether the
man's stumble was not the une xpected result of his voluntary and
misha p-free decision to jum p off the platform. Not only was t his
question not taken u p in the Su preme Court's ne xt major case on the
subject
Landress v. Phoenix Mutual Life Insurance Co. -but the
-

101. See Landress, 291 U.S. at 501 (1934) (Cardozo, J., dissenting) ("The process of
causation was unbroken from exposure up to death."); id. (Cardozo, J., dissenting) ("There
was an accident throughout, or there was no accident at all.").
102. See id. at 501 (Cardozo, J., dissenting) ("If there was no accident in the means,
there was none in the result, for the two were inseparable.").
103. See supra note 16 and accompanying text. But see Scales, supra note 1, at 208
("[T]he logical space between 'means' and 'results' may be reasonably clear . . . . ).
"

104. Linden Motor Freight Co., 193 A.2d 217, 230 (N.J. 1963).
105. Id.
106. Barry, 131 U.S. 100, 121 (1889).
107. Id.
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court also cited the Barry decision as a model in reaffirmin g
accidental-means anal ysis.108
In a series of cases,courts appl yin gaccidental-means anal ysis have
come to opposite conclusions on similar facts. Each collapses into
framin g questions. Consider gunshot wounds. In Oldring v.
Metropolitan Life Insurance Co. ,the decedent incorrectl ybelieved that
he had emptied his gun of its shells, pointe d it at his head and pulled
the tri gger.109 Later investi gations revealed that a sin gle shell had stuck
in the gun s' chamber.110 Observin g that the decedent was
knowled geable about guns and did not anticipate the possibilit y of a
shell remainin g in the chamber, the court found the means
accidental.111 B ycontrast,recall Thompson v. Prudential Insurance Co.
of A merica, a case involvin g a man who lea rned to spin a gun s'
chamber so the bullet lod ged inside never stopped in the firin g
position, and then shot himself to death after one bad spin.112 The
court held that the means were not accidental,reasonin gthat spinnin g
the chamber and pullin g the tri gger were voluntar y actions and that
onl y the bullet s' resultant position in the firin g position was
accidental.113 The distinction depends on how the court framed the
causal chain of events. In Oldring, one could ar gue that the decedent
voluntaril y closed the chamber,pointed the gun at hi mself, and pulled
the tri gger. Those actions occurred without mishap; onl y the
subse quent result was unexpected. A more s ympathetic Thompson
court mi ght have reasoned that the decedent attempted to spin the
chamber of his gun to cause the bullet to land in a certain position.
Because of a mishap,the spin did not go as usual,providin gthe means
for the subse quent result.
Fatal overdoses provide another illustration. Weil v. Federal
Kemper Life Assurance Co. involved a cocaine death.114 Reasonin g
108. Landress, 291 U.S. 491, 497 (1934) (summarizing Barry, 131 U.S. 100 (1889))
("There was evidence . . . that the insured alighted in a manner not intended, causing a jar or
shock of unexpected severity."). Note both that this analysis no longer controls in the federal
context, see supra note 32 and accompanying text, and that many insurance cases arise under
state rather than federal law, cf note 30 (discussing ERISA's effect on expanding federal
jurisdiction over insurance cases).
109. Oldring, 492 F. Supp. 994, 996 (D.N.J. 1980).
1 10. Id.
1 1 1 . The court mentioned that the decedent "was both knowledgeable about [the use of
guns] and accustomed to handling them," and "had qualified as a sharpshooter." Id. As a
result "the decedent's failure to completely empty the weapon of shells before 'playing' with
it, i.e., the presence of a shell which was stuck in the gun's chamber, was an unexpected
occurrence" and thus accidental. Id. at 998.
1 12. Thompson, 66 S.E.2d 1 19 (Ga. Ct. App. 1951); see also supra notes 51-55 and
accompanying text (discussing the case further).
1 1 3. Thompson, 66 S.E.2d at 124 ("The most that can be said . . . is that he hoped the
cartridge would not stop in the firing position when his turn to pull the trigger came.").
114. Weil, 866 P.2d 774, 777 (Cal. 1994).
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bo th tha t the deceden t volun ta rily unde rtook to use cocaine and
assume i ts associa ted risks, and tha t the re was no "sli p, misha p, o r
mischance " p rio r to the resul t, the Califo rnia Su p reme Cou rtheld tha t
the means we re no t acciden tal.115 Com pa re Metropolitan Life
Insurance Co. v. Main,howeve r,whe re the Fif th Ci rcui t reasoned tha t
because a deceden thad no tin ten tionally and volun ta rily se tou t to kill
himself, his fa tal ove rdose of p resc ri p tion d rugs and alcohol
cons ti tu ted acciden tal means.116 The diffe ren tou tcomes we re possible
because the cou rtcould posi tion the doses 'le thali ty ei the ras causes " took mo re than he wan ted " -o ras resul ts - "didn' tex pec ti twould
kill him. "11 7
Unsu rp risingly, simila r p roblems have a risen in au toe ro tic
as phyxia tion cases. Cou rts using acciden tal-means analysis have so fa r
denied recove ry, reasoning tha t the deceden ts in ten tionally and
volun ta rily engaged in the ac tivi ty -s trangula tion - tha t killed them
and, as a resul t, assumed the concomi tan t risks.118 Bu t they could jus t
as easily have loca ted the risks in the resul ts and desc ribed the key
ac tion as failing to reins ta te oxygen flow to the b rain ra the r than
ini tially cu tting i t off. Wi thin this al terna te f raming, deceden ts who
failed to release the p ressu re on thei r necks befo re colla pse o r
cons truc ted mechanical-safe ty sys tems tha tmalfunc tioned,would have
suffe red misha ps whose subse quen t resul ts we re dea ths.119
1 15. Id. at 784. Arguing along similar lines, the court in Laney v. Continental Insurance
Co. noted that its decedent "intentionally and voluntarily drank the alcohol that caused his
death" and that no "mischance, slip or mishap occurred during his consumption of the
whiskey and beer [that killed him by overdose] to cause him to consume more than he
intended." Laney, 757 F.2d 1190, 1192 (11th Cir. 1985). Deploying accidental-means
language, it concluded, "Although the result of his drinking [death] was unexpected, the act
of drinking was intentional." Id.; see also Gordon v. Metro. Life Ins. Co., 260 A.2d 338, 340
(Md. 1970) ("[W]ith the use of [the] illegal drug [heroin] without medical authorization or
supervision, a drug with well known potential for injury, we are hard pressed to say that a
great amount of risk was not assumed, or was unforeseeable.").
1 16. Main, 383 F.2d 952, 960 (5th Cir. 1967) ("Main did not intend to take four times as
many Medomin tablets as Dr. Crouch had prescribed" and "[a]t the time he took such
additional tablets, his judgment, his memory, and his awareness of the lapse of time were all
impaired by the alcohol he had drunk [that] evening.").
1 17. Cf Mansbacher v. Prudential Ins. Co., 7 N.E.2d 18, 20 (N.Y. 1937) ("He took too
much veronal; it was a mistake, a misstep, an unexpected effect from the use of his
prescribed medicine.").
1 18. See MAMSI //I, supra note 11, 825 A.2d 995, 999 (Md. 2003) (Because "the insured
intended to cut off his air supply" and "[t]he cutting off of the air supply caused his death,"
"[h]e intended the act that resulted in his death." (quoting MAMSI Life & Health Ins. Co. v.
Callaway, Circuit Court for Wicomico County, No. 22-C-00-001273 (2001), vacated, MAMSI
//, supra note 11, 806 A.2d 274 (Md. Ct. App. 2002), vacated, MAMSI Ill, supra note 1 1, 825
A.2d 995 (Md. 2003))); Runge v. Metro. Life Ins. Co., 537 F.2d 1 157, 1 159 (4th Cir. 1976)
("Runge, Jr., did not die as a result of 'accidental means.' . . . Death, under these
circumstances, was a natural and foreseeable, though unintended, consequence of Runge's
activity.").
1 19. For an example of a failure to release pressure see Connecticut General Life
Insurance Co. v. Tommie, 619 S.W.2d 199, 201 (Tex. Civ. App. 1981), explaining that " [t]he

2200

Michigan Law Review

[Vol. 103:2172

Because accidental-means analysis cannot provide determinate
grounds for determining accidentalness, it does not represent a viable
alternative to the approach delineated in Section I.A. Courts ought to
hold autoerotic -asphyxiation deaths accidental.
I I.

T HE E FFECT OF I NTENTIONALLY S ELF- I NFLICTED I NJURY
E XCLUSION C LAUSES

Part I claims autoerotic-asphyxiation deaths are accidents within
the meaning of accident-insurance policies. This Part turns to
exclusion clauses. " Virtually all accident policies exclude deaths
resulting from i' ntentionally self-in flicted injury,"' which are the only
exclusion clauses courts have used t o deny recovery in cases of
autoerotic asphyxiation.U0 This Part argues that these exclusion
clauses should not apply to autoerotic-asphyxiation deaths.
Exclusion clauses differentiate instances
where insureds
intentionally injure themselves but then unintentionally incur a further
harm from other types of accidents. The Ohio federal district court in
Fawcett v. Metropolitan Life Insurance Co.related a lucid example :
An insured might so wish to avoid continuing on his job that he plans to
shoot himself in the foot, thus intending to render himself unable to
work, but yet alive. . . . However, upon successfully shooting himself in
the foot, the injured loses consciousness due to the extreme pain and the
gruesome sight of his damaged appendage. Unfortunately, no one hears
the shot, and no one returns home to the home to discover the insured
until many hours have passed, during which time the insured has bled to
death . . . . [T]he insured may not have committed suicide, but his death

exercise rope was equipped with pulleys so that with his left foot he could increase or
decrease the pressure of the rope around his neck." See also Int'! Underwriters, Inc. v. Home
Ins. Co., 662 F.2d 1084, 1085 (4th Cir. 1981) (describing a failed "pulley system . . .
designed . . . to protect [the decedent] from asphyxiation if he lost consciousness").
120. Scales, supra note 1, at 294. While the language of these clauses may vary, it has
rarely affected courts' reasoning. Compare, e.g., Tommie, 619 S.W.2d at 201 ("The policy
specifically excludes from coverage any loss which results directly or indirectly from ' . . .
suicide or intentionally self-inflicted injury,' . . . . " (first alteration in original)), with Sigler I,
supra note 28, 506 F. Supp. 542, 543-44 (S.D. Iowa 1981), affd, 663 F.2d 49 (8th Cir. 1981)
("RISKS NOT ASSUMED: . . . (f) intentionally, self-inflicted injury of any kind, while sane
or insane."). For a case where the language did control, see American Bankers Insurance Co.
v. Gilberts, 181 F.3d 931, 933 (8th Cir. 1999), explaining that under a "bodily injury"
exclusion clause "we cannot say . . . that a reasonable insured would find that a temporary
decrease in the oxygen level in the brain, of itself, is a bodily injury in the ordinary sense of
the term." See also Sims II, supra note 77, 960 F.2d 478, 480 (5th Cir. 1992) (The "policy
excludes 'any loss resulting directly or indirectly, wholly or partly from"' intentionally self
inflicted injury and "[h]is death 'resulted directly or indirectly, wholly or partly from' that
intentionally self-inflicted injury.").
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was certainly caused "wholly or partly, directly or indirectly, by . . . [an]
intentionally self-inflicted injury . . . " 121
.

While this exclusion can, as in the case of autoerotic asphyxiation,
raise difficult questions concerning the definition of an injury and the
necessary link bet ween cause and effect to trigger the policy, no
danger exists that every accidental result will be traced to an
intentionally self-in flicted injury.122
To date, courts have split over the applicability of these exclusion
clauses in cases of autoerotic-asphyxiation deaths.
These
disagreements center on whether aspects of nonfatal autoerotic
asphyxia -that is,partial strangulation -cause injury and,to a lesser
extent, the relationship bet ween an injury and death necessary to
trigger the clause. Many courts have held that "the death was barred
from recovery because of a clause in the insured's policy excluding
coverage f rom i' ntentionally, self-inflicted injury of any kind.'"123
Others have reached the opposite conclusion. 124 Still others have
upheld insurer determinations denying compensation under specific
policy language triggering deferential arbitrary-and-capricious
standards of revie wof insurer determinations.125
121. Fawcett, No. C-3-97-540, 2000 U.S. Dist. LEXIS 10061, at *18-19 (S.D. Ohio June
28, 2000} (quoting Shepherd v. Metro. Life Ins. Co., 1995 U.S. Dist. LEXIS 22203, at *14
(S.D. Ohio Mar. 9, 1995)).
122. For example, when someone crashes his car accidentally the cause may be
distraction or poor skills, but it is not the intentional self-infliction of a prior injury.
Not all commentators find this approach convincing. See Scales, supra note 1, at 294. To
the extent that this analysis is not convincing and one believes no intentionally self-inflicted
injury can be accidental, this Part's analysis would become moot and its conclusion that
recovery should be granted in cases of autoerotic-asphyxiation deaths would automatically
follow. But see Parker v. Danaher Corp., 851 F. Supp. 1287, 1295 (W.D. Ark. 1994)
(concluding an autoerotic-asphyxiation death "constituted an accident," but "hasten(ing] to
say that we are not faced in this case with an exclusionary clause for injury resulting . . . from
an intentionally self-inflicted injury").
123. Sigler II, supra note 12, 663 F.2d 49, 49 (8th Cir. 1981) (quoting Sigler I, supra note
28, 506 F. Supp. 542, 545 (S.D. Iowa 1981), affd, 663 F.2d 49 (8th Cir. 1981}); see also
Critchlow II, supra note 9, 340 F.3d 130 (2d Cir. 2003), vacated and rev'd, 378 F.3d 246 (2d
Cir. 2004}; Sims II, supra note 77, 960 F.2d 478 (5th Cir. 1992); Cronin v. Zurich Am. Ins.
Co., 189 F. Supp. 2d 29 (S.D.N.Y. 2002); Lonergan v. Reliance Std. Life Ins. Co., No. CA-961 1832-PBS, 1997 U.S. Dist. LEXIS 24075 (D.Mass. May 29, 1997); MAMSI III, supra note
11, 825 A.2d 995 (Md. 2003).
124. Critchlow III, supra note 25, 378 F.3d 246 (2d Cir. 2004}; Travis v. Veterans Life
Ins. Co., 60 Fed. Appx. 707 (9th Cir. 2003); Padfield v. AIG Life Ins. Co., 290 F.3d 1121 (9th
Cir. 2002}; Am. Bankers Ins. Co. v. Gilberts, 181 F.3d 931 (8th Cir. 1999}; Conn. Gen. Life
Ins. Co. v. Tommie, 619 S.W.2d 199 (Tex. Civ. App. 1981).
125. Hamilton v. AIG Life Ins. Co., 182 F. Supp. 2d 39 (D.D.C 2002); Fawcett, 2000 U.S.
Dist. LEXIS 10061 (S.D. Ohio 2000) . These arguments proceed by taking the short leap
from observing that defining injury is difficult to concluding that no definition would be
arbitrary and capricious. The problem is that difficult and rational do not so easily map. As
this Part argues, although determining whether autoerotic-asphyxiation deaths trigger
intentionally self-inflicted-injury exclusions can be difficult, the only rational outcome is to
allow recovery. To decide otherwise without further justification would indeed be arbitrary
and capricious.
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In determining whether partial strangulation causes an injury that
precedes and results in death, one must categorize the physical effects
that accompany successf ul incidents of autoerotic asphyxiation.126
Many courts have portrayed them as aberrant, arguing that the body s'
and brain s' compositions and functions are altered for the worse, and
concluding that partial strangulation injures. This Part disagrees by
exposing such argumen ts' rhetorical underpinnings and explaining that
the harms they purport to identify are better characterized as
differences. Because successful autoerotic asphyxiation involves no
permanent harms, no physical injuries, and no loss of autonomy, this
Part concludes it neither constitutes an injury nor triggers the
exclusion.
The changes in the blood's composition and tissue damage that
accompany successful acts of autoerotic asphyxiation are one
candidate for an injury that results from the practice.127 To the credit
of proexclusion courts, few have seriously made this argument.
Temporary and unnoticed alterations in blood composition hardly
appear to constitute an injury and, as one court explained, "[t]he loss
of a few cells could easily be so minimal that it would not rise to the
level of a bodily injury as the average insured would understand the
term."128 To hold otherwise would be to characterize the impact and
holding of breath that accompany diving into a swimming pool as
injuries.
The stronger and more popular pro-injury argument focuses on the
alterations in brain functionality that accompany partial strangulation.
The argument observes "a reduction of the supply of oxygen to the
brain in order to produce a state of hypercapnia [or increased carbon
dioxide in the blood]. "129 This hypercapnia produces "physiological

126. Because decedents do not attempt to commit suicide, the death cannot constitute
the intentional injury. See supra notes 5-11 and accompanying text.
While this Note argues that autoerotic asphyxiation causes no physical changes that both
constitute injuries and result in death, one can identify certain injuries that play no causal
role in death that sometimes accompany autoerotic asphyxiation. Bruising is an example.
When bruising occurs in a lethal episode of autoerotic asphyxiation, an intentionally self
inflicted injury precedes death. But these events do not trigger the exclusion. Because no
causal connection exists between the bruise and the death, the death does not result from the
bruise. See supra notes 120-122 and accompanying text. Because such injuries cannot trigger
the clause, this Note limits its focus infra to physical changes that result from oxygen
deprivation, for this is the aspect of autoerotic asphyxiation that can both cause death and
impede practitioners' ability to interrupt the lethal process once underway.
127. See, e.g., Sims II, supra note 77, 960 F.2d at 480 ("[T]he type of strangulation
desired by Mr. Brumfield damages tissues in the neck . . . . ); Cronin, 189 F. Supp. 2d at 38
(Asphyxia "result[s] in hypoxia (decreased oxygen in the blood) and hypercapnia (increased
carbon dioxide in the blood).").
"

128. Gilberts, 181 F.3d at 933.
129. Tommie, 619 S.W.2d at 203.
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effect[s ],"130including reduced brain activity, "loss of coordination and
self-control," impairment of "the higher cerebral functions of thought,
consciousness and awareness," " 'lightheadedness,... and the inability
to appreciate the hazard of the situation. "'131 These effects are
"abnormal" 132 and, as framed, appear to be both "clearly harmful" 133
and "a h
' urt' to [practitioners'] physical and mental being."134 This
"h
' urt' or h
' arm' is an injury" 135 and so "an injury within the meani ng
of the exclusion occurred." 136 The argument works in part by
conflating harmless effects like lightheadedness with more serious
ones l ike reduced brain activity into a generic laundry l ist of symptoms
that add up to an injury.137 But it also works by identifying a series of
significant alterations to brain function.
To see the weaknesses in the above argument, first note that it
transforms neutral effects into symptoms by using large words to
medicalize unremarkable changes.138 One could just as easily shift the
paradigm to one of difference and observe that asphyxia has some
pleasurable aspects and produces some changes in brain function.139
Because some altered mental states are for the better, and most
cannot be characterized with a single broad stroke, the question
becomes whether the loss of brain function that accompanies asphyxia

130. Critchlow I!, supra note 9, 340 F.3d 130, 132 (2d Cir. 2003), vacated and rev'd, 378
F.3d 246 (2d Cir. 2004).
131. Cronin, 189 F. Supp. 2d at 38 (quoting Reay Aff. '11 5).
132. Id. at 40.
133. Sims v. Monumental Gen. Life Ins. Co., 778 F. Supp. 325, 328 (E.D. La. 1991),
affd, 960 F.2d 478 (5th Cir. 1992) [hereinafter Sims I].
134. Cronin, 189 F. Supp. 2d at 40.
135. Id.
136. Critchlow I!, supra note 9, 340 F.3d 130, 132 (2d Cir. 2003), vacated and rev'd, 378
F.3d 246 (2d Cir. 2004).
137. See Critchlow Ill, supra note 25, 378 F.3d 246, 253 (2d Cir. 2004) (citing expert
opinions analogizing Jightheadedness to changes in body temperature and blood pressure
that do not form injuries).
138. Courts advocating recovery disrupt this process by pointing out its perverse results
and giving medical vocabulary mundane definitions. See, e.g., Critchlow II, supra note 9, 340
F.3d at 138 ("Under that formulation, many activities and exercises would constitute 'injury'
such as to relieve the insurer of the obligation to pay for far less exotic accidents."); Todd II,
supra note 11, 47 F.3d 1448, 1453 (5th Cir. 1995) ("[A]sphyxia, a word denoting a shortage of
oxygen reaching the brain or other bodily tissue.").
139. Following this line, one court suggested asphyxia is harmless and enjoyable because
"a state of hypercapnia simply alters the amount of oxygen in the brain, thus heightening or
intensifying certain body sensations." Conn. Gen. Life Ins. Co. v. Tommie, 619 S.W.2d 199
(Tex. Civ. App. 1981); see also Padfield v. AIG Life Ins. Co., 290 F.3d 1121, 1 129 (9th Cir.
2002) (Autoerotic asphyxia causes "temporary deprivation of oxygen, a euphoric light
headedness . . . , and an intensified sexual experience."). Another noted no evidence "that
the procedure involves pain of any kind." Am. Bankers Ins. Co. v. Gilberts, 181 F.3d 931,
933 (8th Cir. 1999).
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con stitute s an injury. 140 It s effect s are short-lived, so the lo ss of brain
function is a temporary side effect of a plea surable experience. The
experience can thu s be analogized to u se of sleeping pill s or "a
swimmer hold n
i g hi s or her breath wh ile under water. "141 Mo st
laypeople would identi fy ne ither ca se a s illu strating an intentionally
self-infl ci ted injury to one self, and ab sent someone specifically
framing the problem in term s of lo ss of brain activ ity,mo st would not
def ine such temporary effect sa s injurie s. 142
Thi s analogical rea son ing ha s sat unea sily with some court s. A s
one put it : "Any def init o
i n of 'injury' that exc lude s strangulat ion whether fatal or not - i s simply unrea sonable. "143 Rather than
cl inically de scr ibing a sphyxiation 's effect s on the brain, the se court s
have focu sed on the intuition that strangulation con stitute s "a wrong
to the integrity of [one' s] own body. "144 A number have buttre ssed and
elucidated thi sclaim by analogizing autoerotic a sphyxiation to battery:
"If . . . a robber had partially strangled him, we would have no trouble
holding that Mr. Brumfield had been in jured and that the robber

140. It is worth noting that in its strong form, the above argument is fragile. As one
court points out, "That decedent had engaged in this very activity on prior occasions without
apparently serious or permanent adverse consequences does not mean that the activity did
not injure him . . . . " Critchlow II, supra note 9, 340 F.3d at 132-33. And to the extent that the
argument depends on the absence of pain or the actual lack of any permanent damage at all,
insurance companies could counter with evidence that placing sufficient pressure on one's
neck to cut the flow of oxygen to one's brain is often both painful and a cause of minor tissue
damage. These rebuttals, however, do little to counter the weaker intuition of the argument:
the decedent intentionally engaged in asphyxia because he thought he would enjoy it and,
· most likely, did not think it would harm him. In this sense, the decedent might analogize his
change in mental state to anti-depressants by claiming both are for the better.
141. MAMSI 111, supra note 1 1 , 825 A.2d 995, 1007 (Md. 2003) (summarizing MAMSI
ll, supra note 1 1 , 806 A.2d 274 (Md. App. 2002), vacated, MAMSJ Ill, supra note 11, 825
A.2d 995 (Md. 2003). For a discussion of the rapidity and completeness of the return to
normalcy following successful incidents of autoerotic asphyxiation, see Padfield: "(The
decedent's] oxygen level would then have been restored (had he survived] . . . and he would
have returned home uninjured." Padfield, 290 F.3d at 1129; see also Critchlow II, supra note
9, 340 F.3d 130 (2d Cir. 2003), (Kearse, J., dissenting) (Asphyxia has "no serious or lasting
adverse impact on one's health."), vacated and rev'd, 378 F.3d 246 (2d Cir. 2004); Gilberts,
181 F.3d at 933 ("There was essentially no evidence advanced for purposes of summary
judgment . . . that an individual's body is any different after the performance of partial
asphyxia in this manner than it was before . . . . ").
142. Critchlow Ill, supra note 25, 378 F.3d at 262 (reasoning that the "nonserious,
temporary changes in condition" that accompany partial strangulation "are not what persons
of reasonable or average intelligence and experience would ordinarily understand to be
meant by 'injuries"').
143. Critchlow I, supra note 5, 198 F. Supp. 2d 318, 327 (W.D.N.Y. 2002), atfd, 340 F.3d
130 (2d Cir. 2003), vacated and rev'd, 378 F.3d 246 (2d Cir. 2004).
144. Cronin v. Zurich Am . Ins. Co., 189 F. Supp. 2d 29, 39 (S.D . N.Y. 2002) (quoting
at http://www.oed.com (last visited Feb. 12, 2002))
("A reasonably intelligent person would conclude that the 'purposely self-inflicted injury
exclusion' applies to situations where the policyholder causes a wrong to the integrity of his
own body to cause himself 'suffering or mischief willfully and unjustly inflicted."').
OXFORD ENGLISH DICTIONARY ONLINE,
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should be held criminally liable." 145 Such analogies suggests a parallel
bet ween an individual disrupting the flo w of oxygen to his o wn brain
and a third party doing it, note that the latter is clearly injurious, and
conclude that all partial strangulation interrupts the normal operation
of one's body and thereby violates its integrity.
Although the fact that courts have often described death scenes in
autoerotic-asphyxiation cases with language evocative of homicide
reports strengthens the metaphor bet ween fatal autoerotic
asphyxiation and murder, the comparison also gives a way the game.146
The problem with any argument focusing on the wrongs partial
strangulation causes to the integrity of one's body is that it conflates
the word's technical and popular definitions. While strangulation can
describe depriving oneself oxygen, it generally pertains to violent,
third-party batteries. The analogy works not by sho wing t wo examples
of asphyxiation,but by attaching to autoerotic asphyxiation the violent
loss of autonomy people associate with criminal or tortious batteries. 147
An illustration may help. Imagine a series of situations where a
person exercises varying degrees of control over her temporary
deprivation of oxygen : holding one's breath under water, a child being
dunked under water while horseplaying in a pool, and a would -be
robber strangling his vict im into submission. It hardly seems like an
injury or a violation of one's body's integrity to s wim a distance in a
pool. While we might see a stronger case where one child dunks
another,it still feels weak. But by the time we imagine a person facing
a would-be robber who is strangling her into submission, the case for
injury has become strong.
To distinguish the under water swimmer and strangling robber,
compare the mental states of the asphyxiated individuals. The
s wimmer alters her body chemistry and function voluntarily. She
expects to surface and return to normal and does not perceive herself
as causing her body any harm. But the victim of a strangling robber
does not voluntarily deprive herself of oxygen. She does not kno w
whether she will survive and perceives the third party as causing her
harm. The injury inheres inthe loss of autonomy,the apparent danger,
its potential permanence, the resultant psychological injury, and the
actor's malignant intent. Understood this way, the analogy
145. Sims II, supra note 77, 960 F.2d 478, 480 (5th Cir. 1992); see also Critchlow /, supra
note 5, 198 F. Supp. 2d at 324-25; Sims I, supra note 133, 778 F. Supp. 325, 328 (E.D. La.
1991), affd, 960 F.2d 478 (5th Cir. 1992); Sigler I, supra note 28, 506 F. Supp. 542, 545 (S.D.
Iowa 1981), affd, 663 F.2d 49 (8th Cir. 1981).
146. See, e.g., Bennett v. Am. Int'l Life Assurance Co., 956 F. Supp. 201, 203 (N.D.N.Y.
1997) ("[A) plastic bag covered the [head), and a green tie was loosely looped around his
head with a slip knot.").
147. For further discussion of linguistic links between autoerotic asphyxiation and
criminal activity as well as the links' analytic weakness, see supra notes 76-78, 82-85 and
accompanying text.
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underscores the absence of injury n
i successfu l acts of autoerotic
asphyx ia .
Where adopted, the "reasonab le-expectations doctrine " may
mandate the sa me resu lt.148 Th si doctrine grew ou t of the traditiona l
interpretat o
i na l canon tha t a mbiguous ter ms shou d
l be construed
aga inst their drafters.149 Rather than lo ok so le yl to a contract's
language, howe ver, the doctr ine asks whether the s gi nator ies who d id
not draf t the contract wou d
l reasonab ly expect a poten tia l resu tl .150 If
not,the doc tr n
i e d si fa vors that outco me. 15 1
When peop le who engage in autoerot ic asphyxia tion purchase
acc id en tinsurance they can reasonab y
l expect that the pract ice wi llbe
co vered. 152 Prac titioners experience au toerot ci asphyx ia tio n as
p el asurab e
l , intend to cause the mse lves no har m, and often do not
cause any ha rm to the mse lves 1. 53 A lthough cour ts appear capab le of
co mbin ing the phys ica l and menta l e f ec ts of part ia l strangu lation to
create the i mpression of injury , autoerot ic-asphyx ia tio n pract ti o
i ners
wou ld like y
l disagree and f n
i d the extension of the c a
l use to the ri
ac ti vit ies bo th unreasonab e
l and unfair.154 Moreo ver , most insureds do
no t read the difficu lt-to-understand contracts of adhes ion tha t the ri
po lic e
i s const itute , and n
i s tead depend on insurers ' good fa ith when
they assent to whate ver part icu al r exc u
l sions app y
l . 155 A lthough
insurers are aware of the pract ci e and cou d
l eas ily insert a separate

148. For a swnmary of jurisdictions accepting and rejecting the reasonable-expectations
doctrine, see, for example, Henderson, supra note 94, at 823, 828, 834-35.
149. This principle, known as contra proferentem, is embodied in § 206 of the
Restatement (Second) of Contracts: "In choosing among the reasonable meanings of a
promise or agreement or a term thereof, that meaning is generally preferred which operates
against the party who supplies the words or from whom a writing otherwise proceeds."
RESTATEMENT (SECOND) OF CONTRACTS § 206 (1981).
150. For a clear and insightful review of the modem manifestations of the reasonable
expectations doctrine, see Mark C. Rahdert, Reasonable Expectations Revisited, 5 CONN.
INS. L.J. 107 (1998). Some courts that purport to adopt reasonable-expectations doctrine
apply it identically to contra proferentem. Henderson, supra note 94, at 826. This Note
excludes these jurisdictions from its discussion of reasonable-expectations doctrine because
the purpose of this discussion is to elucidate the additional support the doctrine provides.
151. Rahdert, supra note 150.
152 See supra note 94.
153. See supra notes 5, 139, 141-142 and accompanying text.
154. Difficulties in identifying autoerotic-asphyxiation prac!Ittoners make
statements about their opinions speculative. See supra note 8 and accompanying text.

any

155. See, e.g. , Burr v. Commercial Travelers Mut. Accident Ass'n, 67 N.E.2d 248, 251
(N.Y. 1 946) (discussing difficulties in formulating a written definition of accident);
RESTATEMENT (SECOND) OF CONTRACTS § 211 comment b (1981) ("Customers do not in
fact ordinarily understand or even read the standard terms. They trust to the good faith of
the party using the form. . . . ") ; cf Henderson, supra note 94, at 838 ("Insurance contracts
are generally contracts of adhesion . . . . ).
"

August 2005]

Word Games

2207

clause excluding autoerotic -as phyxiation deaths, they do not.156 As a
result, various formulations of the still -develo ping reasonable 
ex pectations doctrine could re quire courts in those jurisdictions that
have ado pted it to negate the clause's a p plication to autoerotic 
as phyxiation deaths.157
Intentionally self-inflicted injury exclusions should not a p ply in
cases of autoerotic-as phyxiation deaths. While in some cases
decedents die as a result of the effects of as phyxia overwhelming the
mental awareness, decisionmaking abilities, and motor skills they
de pend on to survive,they do not intentionally inflict this or any other
injury on themselves. Rather, practitioners of autoerotic as phyxiation
tem porarily alter their mental state for pleasure. Des pite the
associations with third- party strangulation that courts attach to self 
induced as phyxia, it does not result in a loss of autonomy. The
physical changes to one's mental state it causes parallel those most
lay peo ple would label noninjurious.158 Claimants should recover.
CONCLUSION

This Note has argued that courts facing the most common
accident-insurance policies ought to grant recovery in cases of deaths
arising from autoerotic as phyxiation. By a p proaching the problem
formally, Part I demonstrated that autoerotic-as phyxiation deaths
constitute accidents under viable a p proaches to the issue. Part I I
turned to exclusions, observing that intentionally self-inflicted injury

156. See E-mail from Thomas Corcoran, Principal, Towers Perrin to author (Jan. 3,
2005, 03:51 PM EST) (on file with author).
157. Because autoerotic-asphyxiation practitioners would likely find the application of
these clauses to their practices unfair and unreasonable, they would run afoul of the
Restatement (Second) of Contracts, which refuses to enforce any term that an insurer had
"reason to believe [an insured] would not [assent to] if he knew that the writing contained
[that) particular term." RESTATEMENT (SECOND) OF CONTRACTS § 211(3) (1981); see also
Henderson, supra note 94, at 825 ("The objectively reasonable expectations of applicants
and intended beneficiaries regarding the terms of insurance contracts will be honored even
though painstaking study of the policy provisions would have negated those expectations."
(quoting Robert E. Keeton, Insurance Law Rights at Variance with Policy Provisions, 83
HARV. L. R EV. 961, 967 (1970))). To the extent that autoerotic-asphyxiation practitioners do
not intend to kill themselves and hope to receive pleasure rather than injury from their
activities, some courts would be "willing to ignore clear policy language" on grounds of
'"situational unfairness,' where standard-form insurance policies result in unfair coverage
restrictions when applied to a unique policyholder." David J. Seno, The Doctrine of
Reasonable Expectations in Insurance Law: What to Expect in Wisconsin, 85 MARQ . L. REV.
859, 867-68 (2002); cf Rahdert, supra note 150, at 127 ("Most . . . of the arguments advanced
by . . . proponents of the doctrine . . . have focused principally on this aspect of the
reasonable expectations idea.").
158. To the extent that viable parallel alternative arguments exist, the interpretive
canon of contra proferentem and its requirement that language susceptible to multiple
meanings be resolved against the drafters of contracts (here insurers) mandates the same
result. See supra note 149.
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clauses are the most common relevant clauses and ex plaining that
because autoerotic as phyxiation is not in jurious it does not trigger
them. As a result, absent exce ptional and additional exclusions,
claimants on the accident-insurance policies of autoerotic
as phyxiation decedents should recover.

